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The national do-not-call registry was established in 2003 for consumers to utilize
and block many commercial telemarketing calls. The registry was authorized by
Congressional legislation and is being enforced by rules enacted by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC").
1
However, before the registry went into effect, telemarketers filed legal challenges on
First Amendment grounds, and these cases have now worked their way through the
appeals process.
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, upheld the do-not-call
registry as constitutional in Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission, a ruling the Supreme Court allowed to stand by denying certiorari later
that year. 2 In Mainstream Marketing, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the registry was
supported by substantial regulatory goals of protecting consumer privacy and
preventing fraudulent and abusive telemarketing calls. 3 In addition, the appeals court
concluded the do-not-call registry comprised an effective and narrow means of
addressing these regulatory goals under the Central Hudson analysis, 4 a controversial
form of intermediate constitutional scrutiny utilized in commercial speech cases. 5 In
previous cases, federal district and appeals courts had utilized the Central Hudson
analysis to uphold a federal ban on unsolicited telefax advertising.
6
* Assistant Professor, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. J.D., Ph.D University of Florida.
1. The amalgam of federal legislation and FCC and FTC rules will be referred to collectively in this
article as a whole regulatory scheme known as the "national do-not-call registry," which was the approach
taken by the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. F.T.C.,
358 F.3d 1228, 1234 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004). When relevant to the analysis and discussion, the separate do-not-
call rules of the FCC and FTC will be mentioned individually.
2. See Mainstream Mktg., Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
812(2004).
3. Id. at 1237.
4. Id. at 1246.
5. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525 (2001); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
6. See Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003); Destination
Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995); Texas v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1085
(W.D. Tex. 2000); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997). These cases are
covered in more detail in a subsequent section of this article.
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Technological advances in modes of communication delivery allow precise
targeting of commercial messages to individual recipients more so than ever before.
These advances include robust computerized databases of consumer information that
allow advertisers and marketers to develop lists of consumers whose parameters are
tailored to the particular product or service under promotion. In addition, over the
years, technological advances have increased the available modes of delivery for
targeted messages from door-to-door and direct mail solicitation, and to solicitation by
telephone, telefax and electronic mail. Similarly, technological advances now allow
advertisers and marketers to better accommodate the preferences of individual
consumers not to receive their commercial communications. The national do-not-call
registry is perhaps the best current example of these phenomena, given the reliance on
technology to create and maintain the national database, and requires compliance by
telemarketers with registry requirements to utilize the database to scrub telephone
numbers from their calling databases.
This article explores in detail the constitutional issues raised by government
regulation of targeted communications and telemarketing specifically. The first section
of the article provides an overview of the federal legislation and administrative rules
relevant to the creation and enforcement of the national do-not-call registry. Next, the
article identifies and explains the First Amendment implications of regulation in this
context. In light of the constitutional issues, the third and fourth sections of the article
then provide an overview of constitutional challenges to regulations banning unsolicited
telefax advertising and the federal do-not-call registry requirements. The final section
provides a summary and conclusions.
II. TELEMARKETERS AND DO-NOT-CALL: REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE LANDSCAPE
The concept of a centralized do-not-call registry is not new. For instance, the
Direct Marketing Association ("DMA"), a trade association for the direct marketing
industry, has maintained a voluntary do-not-call database for its members since 1985
called the Telephone Preference Service ("TPS"). 7 Consumers must subscribe to the
TPS do-not-call list, which DMA members use to periodically "scrub" their
telemarketing lists.8 However, as pointed out by the FTC when it began proceedings on
a proposed national do-not-call registry in 1999, the DMA is an industry-based
organization with voluntary membership and no legal authority to enforce do-not-call
7. Meeting Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,124, 66,125 n.12 (FTC Nov. 24, 1999) (noting that "the idea of a
central 'no call' list is not new" and noting that the DMA had maintained its no-call database called the
"Telephone Preference Service"). See generally Patricia Faley, Doing the Right Thing: The Case for the
Teleservices Industry, 21 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 332 (2002) (arguing that the national do-not call registry
was not needed because of the Telephone Preference Service maintained by the Direct Marketing Association
and free for consumers who desired to cut down the number telemarketing calls they received from DMA
members).
8. Direct Marketing Association, Getting off telephone call lists/Telephone Preference Service, at
http://www.dmaconsumers.org/cgi/offtelephone (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). The TPS database is updated
monthly and some companies have chosen to receive the list monthly. Id. Consumers can register online for
a $5 fee or by mail for free. Id. Some non-member companies utilize the DMA's TPS database. Id. The
DMA TPS database does not list business telephone numbers, and the list does not prevent "sequentially




Ultimately, both the FTC and FCC enacted do-not-call rules in 2003 that banned
unsolicited commercial telemarketing calls to subscribers to the national registry
established and maintained by the FTC. Both agencies were under directives by
Congress to regulate telemarketing to protect consumer privacy among other goals.
This section of the article sets out the relevant federal statutes and related FTC and FCC
rules that established the current regulatory scheme comprising the national do-not-call
registry.
A. The Telemarketing Act (1994) and Amended Telemarketing Sales Rule (2003)
The role of the FTC in telemarketing regulation can be traced to the Federal
Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1994
("Telemarketing Act"). 10  In the Telemarketing Act, Congress directed the FTC to
make rules prohibiting "deceptive" and "other abusive" telemarketing acts andS 11
practices. In the legislation, Congress defined "telemarketing" as any "plan, program,
or campaign which is conducted to induce purchases of goods or services" by
telephone. 12 Congress concluded it was time for government intervention based on
findings that telemarketing fraud was costing American consumers and others
approximately $40 billion per year and was a significant problem. 13
In the Telemarketing Act, Congress ordered the FTC to enact rules limiting the
hours of the day that telemarketers could legally call consumers and requiring
telemarketers to "promptly and clearly" disclose to consumers whether the purpose of
their calls was to sell goods or services. 14 In addition, Congress ordered the FTC to
create a specific rule prohibiting telemarketers from "undertak[ing] a pattern of
unsolicited telephone calls which the reasonable consumer would consider coercive or
9. Meeting Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. at 66,125 n. 12. In addition, commentators have questioned the
potential effectiveness of self-regulatory initiatives as effective means of privacy protection for consumers.
See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal
Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1094-1099 (1999) (writing that "pessimism about the willingness of the
information industry to adopt a consumer consent system seems more justified given the limited efforts taken
to date to protect consumer privacy and their questionable effectiveness" and "[clritics of the information
industry complain that self-regulation has not been effective"). On this point, Sovern recounted a study
conducted by a trade magazine and cited by the FTC in which requests for written do-not-call policies were
submitted to 48 telemarketers. See id. at 1098. As reported by Sovem, in that study, only 17 of the
telemarketers had responded to the requests after three months despite federal law that requires telemarketers
to furnish their do-not-call policies upon request. Id. (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2)(1999)).
10. Pub. L. 103-297, 108 Stat. 1545 (Aug. 16, 1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1).
12. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-297, § 7(4),
108 Stat. 1545 (Aug. 16, 1994). As will be discussed, in 2001, Congress amended the definition of
"telemarketing" in the Telemarketing Act to include for-profit telemarketers hired by non-profit organizations
to make calls for charitable donations. See infra note 34.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 6101. Congress did not include in the Telemarketing Act any specific findings with
regard to consumer privacy. See id.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(3)(B)-(D). One commentator wrote in 1986 that reasonable restrictions on
calling hours for telemarketers were likely to be treated by courts as constitutional time, place and manner
restrictions although such calling hours would be problematic for telemarketers trying to reach individuals
with "non-traditional work schedules," for instance. Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone
Calls and the Right of Privacy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 99,113-14 (1986).
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abusive of [his or her] right to privacy."
15
In response to the Telemarketing Act, the FTC enacted the 1995 Telemarketing
Sales Rule ("TSR") 16 and included two specific prohibitions aimed at protecting
consumer privacy. 17  First, the rule prohibited telemarketers from calling consumers
"repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass."' 18  Secondly, the
rule required telemarketers to maintain their own company-specific lists of consumers
who asked them not to call and prohibited them from calling these consumers. 19  The
current version of the TSR retains both of these prohibitions.
2 1
In 1999, the FTC initiated a review of the TSR, in part, to consider whether to
establish a mandatory national do-not-call registry. 22  As grounds, the FTC cited
increasing consumer concerns about privacy and unwanted telemarketing calls. 23  In
addition, the agency concluded that state efforts to regulate telemarketing were on the
rise with eight states having established centralized do-not-call databases for local
24consumers.
After concluding its review of the TSR, the FTC initiated formal rulemaking
proceedings in 2002 and ultimately proposed amendments. 25  After taking and
considering public comments, the FTC amended the TSR in 2003 (Amended TSR) and
included the do-not-call registry requirements. 26  The Amended TSR prohibits
telemarketing calls offering the sale of goods or services to a subscriber to the national
do-not-call registry created and maintained by the agency.
27
15. 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(3)(A).
16. Federal Trade Commission, Telemarketing Sales Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,842 (Aug. 23, 1995)
(codified at 310 C.F.R. pt. 310).
17. Id. at 43,854-55.
18. Id. at 43,854 (codified currently at 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(i)).
19. Id. at 43,854-55.
20. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.1-.9 (West, WESTLAW through Dec. 28, 2005).
21. 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.4(b)(1)(i), (iii)(A). The first of these prohibitions bans telemarketers from
"[c]ausing any telephone to ring, or engaging any person in telephone conversation, repeatedly or
continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number." 16 C.F.R. §
310.4(b)(1)(i). The second of these prohibitions bans telemarketers from "[ilnitiating any outbound telephone
call to a person when ... that person previously has stated that he or she does not wish to receive an outbound
telephone call made by or on behalf of the seller whose goods or services are being offered or made on behalf
of the charitable organization for which a charitable contribution is being solicited." 16 C.F.R. §
310.4(b)(l)(iii)(A).
22. Federal Trade Commission, Notice of Public Meeting, 64 Fed Reg. 66,124 (Nov. 24, 1999).
23. Id. at 66,125 n.l l.
24. Id. Those states were Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Oregon and
Tennessee. Id.
25. Federal Trade Commission, Telemarketing Sales Rule, Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 4,492 (Jan. 30,
2002)
26. Federal Trade Commission, Telemarketing Sales Rule, Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,580 (Jan. 29,
2003) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
27. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(i) (West, WESTLAW through Dec. 28,
2005). Telemarketing calls to do-not-call registry subscribers without their consent would be at least one
manner of defining an "unsolicited" telephone call that is likely to be objectionable to recipients. See Nadel,
supra note 14, at 108-09 (characterizing defining the term "unsolicited" with regard to telephone calls as one
of the key issues with regard to telephone regulation on grounds of protecting consumer privacy). Professor
Nadel suggested that any definition of "unsolicited calls" should consider "whether the call has been
implicitly solicited, or made to a business, or made by a caller having a prior relationship with the recipient."
Id. at 108. He also noted that in 1980, the FCC had ended a three-year investigation and concluded that the
term had no precise meaning but meant generally "a business call from an organization with which the
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The Amended TSR has two key exemptions to the do-not-call registry• 28
requirements. First, a company can legally call a registry subscriber with whom it has
an "established business relationship." 29 "Established business relationship" means a
subscriber who has purchased or leased goods or services from that company within the
preceding 18 months, or has made an "inquiry or application regarding a product or
service" to that company within the preceding three months. 30  To avoid these calls,
consumers must make a do-not-call request to each company with which they establish
a business relationship regardless of whether or not they are subscribers to the national
registry.
3 1
In addition, the do-not-call registry requirements only apply to commercial
telemarketing calls defined as "outbound telephone calls to induce the purchase of
goods or services."' 32  Therefore, telephone callers conducting research, calling on
behalf of political campaigns, or seeking charitable contributions are exempt from the
do-not-call registry requirements. 33  Although the FTC recently asserted jurisdiction
over commercial (for-profit) telemarketers hired by non-profit groups to collect
charitable donations for a fee, 34 the agency ultimately decided to exempt these so-called
recipient has had minimal if any prior dealings [but not] ... unwelcome personal calls or misdialed calls." Id.
at 108 n.56 (quoting Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1029 n.9 (1980)).
28. Whether to distinguish between types of telephone solicitations is an important constitutional and
public policy decision for regulators. For instance, Professor Nadel wrote in 1986 that deciding "[w]hether
regulations should treat different types of unsolicited calls differently is [an] important question." Nadel,
supra note 14, at 109. He concluded then that the "debate on this issue has generally focused on whether
noncommercial calls should be made exempt from regulation ....... Id. He also concluded then that
"prominent commentators agree that noncommercial callers should not be regulated." Id. at 110.
29. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii).
30. Id. § 310.2(n).
31. Id. § 310.4(b)(I)(iii)(B)(ii).
32. Id. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B).
33. The FTC does not have jurisdiction over non-profit organizations calling for noncommercial
purposes. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (West, WESTLAW through 2004).
34. Federal Trade Commission, Telemarketing Sales Rule, Final Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,580, 4,679
(Jan. 29, 2003). In 2001, Congress amended the Telemarketing Act's definition of"telemarketing" to include
telefunder calls. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Subsequently, the
FTC incorporated this amended definition into the Telemarketing Sales Rule. Federal Trade Commission,
Telemarketing Sales Rule (Final Rule), 68 Fed. Reg. 4,580-85, 4,595 (Jan. 29, 2003) (codified at 16 C.F.R.
pt. 310/2(cc)) (noting the Congressional amendment to the definition of "telemarketing" in the Telemarketing
Act and noting that the definition of "telemarketing" was being amended accordingly in the Telemarketing
Sales Rule). In National Federation of the Blind v. FTC, 303 F. Supp. 2d 707, 711-12, 714 (D. Md. 2004), a
federal district court held that the FTC has jurisdiction over for-profit telemarketers who call on behalf of non-
profit organizations seeking charitable contributions. In that case, non-profit organizations challenged the
jurisdiction of the FTC to regulate the for-profit telemarketers that they hire to call and seek charitable
contributions on their behalf. Id. at 711-12. The federal district judge rejected that argument and concluded
that by amending the definition of "telemarketing" in the Telephone Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention
Act to include telemarketing calls made to solicit charitable contributions implicitly granted the FTC authority
to regulate for-profit companies hired by non-profit organizations to conduct their solicitation campaigns for
charitable donations even though the FTC did not have jurisdiction over the non-profit organizations
themselves. Id. See also, Ely R. Levy and Norman Silber, Nonprofit Fundraising and Consumer Protection:
A Donor's Right to Privacy, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 519, 553-56 (2004) (concluding that the PATRIOT
Act amendments confer to the FTC jurisdiction over for-profit companies that solicit charitable contributions
on behalf of non-profits even though the agency lacks direct jurisdiction over the non-profits themselves);
Augusta Meacham, To Call or Not to Call? An Analysis of Current Charitable Telemarketing Regulations, 12
COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 61, 66-68 (2004) (also discussing the PATRIOT Act amendments and FTC
jurisdiction over for-profit companies that solicit charitable contributions on behalf of non-profits in response
to "sham organizations" that fraudulently solicited donations from unsuspecting donors in the wake of the
[Vol. 32:1
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"telefunder" calls 35 from the do-not-call registry requirements.
36
Subsequently, Congress passed the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003 and
authorized the FTC to establish fees to fund creation and enforcement of the do-not-call
registry. 37 In response, the FTC amended the Telemarketing Sales Rule again in 2003
to include annual fees for telemarketer access to the do-not-call registry. 38  Neither
Congress nor the FTC intended consumers to bear financial costs associated with
subscribing to the national do-not-call registry.
B. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (1991) and FCC Rules
When Congress enacted the 1994 Telemarketing Sales Act in 1994, federal
legislation already was in place that defined the role of the FCC in telemarketing
regulation. 39  That legislation-the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
("TCPA")- included various restrictions on telephone solicitations. Specifically, the
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001).
35. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 303 F. Supp. at 711 (referring to "for profit entities that solicit
charitable contributions on behalf of non-profit organizations" as "telefunders").
36. Federal Trade Commission, Final Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4,636-37. The
exemption for teleflunders was a change from the original do-not-call registry requirements as proposed by the
FTC in 2002. Federal Trade Commission, Telemarketing Sales Rule, Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 4,492,
4,516-17 (Jan. 30, 2002). In the original version, telefunders were not exempt from the requirements of the
do-not-call registry. Id. However, the final version of the amended Telemarketing Sales Rule exempted
telefanders from the requirements of the national do-not-call registry. Telefunders still must comply with
various provisions in the Telemarketing Sales Rule including the prohibition on repeated or continuous calls
made "with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person," and the prohibition on calling anyone who .has made
a specific request to that telemarketer not to call. 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.2(cc), 310.4(b)(1)(i), 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A).
37. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, 108 Pub. L. No. 10, 117 Stat. 557, § 3 (2003). The Do-
Not-Call Implementation Act also authorized the FTC to "promulgate regulations establishing fees sufficient
to implement and enforce the 'do-not-call' registry of the Telemarketing Sales Rule." 108 Pub. L. 10, 117
Stat. 557, § 2. The FTC was authorized to collect fees from 2003 through 2007. Id. The fees collected only
can be used "to offset the costs of activities and services related to the implementation and enforcement of the
Telemarketing Sales rule, and other activities resulting from such implementation and enforcement." Id.
38. Federal Trade Commission, Telemarketing Sales Rule Fees, Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,134, 45,144
(July 31, 2003) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 310.8). Telemarketers accessing the do-not-call registry are charged
an annual fee of $24 per area code with the first five area codes being provided for free. Id. The total annual
fee for each telemarketer is capped at $7,373. Id. In the context of telemarketing regulation, Professor Nadel
wrote in 1986 that "[t]he First Amendment does not permit callers to be saddled with unreasonable taxing
obligations, nor does it permit receptive subscribers to be burdened by extra duties" and that "[tihe right of
privacy would presumably include the right to enjoy privacy without incurring excessive expenses." Nadel,
supra note 14, at 114. He concluded then that in the context of telemarketing regulation, an important issue to
be resolved would be "what burdens may be placed on those who wish to maintain their privacy." Id. at 115.
The FTC was cognizant of potential constitutional issues arising from mandatory fees for telemarketers
required to access the do-not-call registry. 68 Fed. Reg. at 43,134-35. After considering various public
comments on the issue, the FTC ultimately concluded that the fee structure was "more akin to the registration
fees or business licenses that are commonly imposed upon businesses before they can engage in commercial
speech" and, thus, constitutionally sound. Id. In 2004, the United States Tenth Circuit upheld the fees
provisions as constitutional. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1247-
48 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding "that the registry fees are a permissible regulatory measure designed to offset
projected expenses incident to the administration and enforcement of the national do-not-call list, not an
unconstitutional revenue tax"). The constitutional issues surrounding the fees provisions of the Telemarketing
Sales Rule are otherwise beyond the scope of this article.
39. The role of the FTC is discussed first in this article, however, because the FTC took the lead in
creating and enforcing the national do-not-call registry, as will be discussed, and enacted its do-not-call
registry provisions before the FCC.
40. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2395 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1991)).
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TCPA prohibited the use of artificial and prerecorded voices to deliver messages to
consumers on their home telephones, 4 1 and transmission of unsolicited advertisements
to telephone facsimile (telefax) machines.42 In addition, the TCPA directed the FCC to
make enforcement regulations for these provisions.
43
In the TCPA, Congress also directed the FCC to enact regulations to "protect
residential telephone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone
solicitations to which they object." 44 The TCPA authorized-but did not require-the
FCC to set up a national do-not-call database for residential telephone customers who
objected to receiving telephone solicitations 45 and prohibit telemarketing calls to those
customers. 46  However, in a 1992 Report and Order, the FCC declined to adopt a
national database as too expensive and difficult to set up and accurately maintain. 47 In
addition, the FCC feared that a national database would be used by "unscrupulous"
telemarketers to obtain unlisted numbers and thereby undermine its value as a means of
protecting consumer privacy.
48
Instead, the FCC required telemarketers to maintain their own lists of consumers
who had specifically asked them not to call and abide by these requests. 49 The FCC
then found that "company-specific do-not-call list[s] . . . represent[] a careful balancing
of the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers against the commercial
speech rights of telemarketers and the continued viability of a valuable business
service." 50 Thus, the company-specific approach became the policy choice of the FCC
and represented an apparent compromise between industry self-regulation and a
mandatory national do-not-call database.
In 2002, however, the FCC concluded that telemarketing practices had "changed
significantly" since 1992 and began a new rulemaking proceeding to reconsider
implementing a national do-not-call database. 51 The FCC cited as factors the increased
41. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B).
42. Id. § 227(b)(1)(C).
43. Id. § 227(b)(2).
44. Id. § 227(c)(1). Additional provisions in the TCPA required the FCC to initiate a rulemaking
proceeding within 120 days of enactment of the TCPA on December 20, 1991. Id. The TCPA required the
FCC to conclude the rulemaking proceeding within nine months and "prescribe regulations to implement
methods and procedures for protecting the privacy rights" of telephone subscribers as described in the act. Id.
§ 227(c)(2).
45. Id. § 227(c)(3).
46. Id. § 227(c)(3)(F).
47. In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 14 (Sept. 17, 1992). The FCC estimated at that time that a
national do-not-call database would cost some $20 million to establish and operate for the first year. Id. In
addition, the FCC concluded, necessary updates to the database-as often as every three months-would have
increased the cost of operation. Id.
48. Id. 15. See Michael E. Shannon, Note, Combating Unsolicited Sales Calls: The "Do-Not-Call"
Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS. 318, 395-96, 398-408 (2001) (discussing the
1992 decision by the FCC not to adopt a national do-not-call registry and then various other arguments that
have been asserted against such a regulatory vehicle).
49. 7 F.C.C.R. 8752 23 (company-specific do-not-call requirements currently codified at 47 C.F.R. §
64.1200(d) (WEST, Westlaw, current through Dec. 27, 2004)).
50. Id. In addition, the FCC concluded that "the company-specific do-not-call list alternative is the most
effective and efficient means to permit telephone subscribers to avoid unwanted telephone solicitations" and
"would allow residential [telephone] subscribers to selectively halt calls from telemarketers from which they
do not wish to hear." Id.
51. Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Notice of
(Vol. 32:1
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number of consumer complaints about unwanted telemarketing calls since 1992, the
potential advantages for both telemarketers and consumers of a centralized do-not-call
database over company-specific lists, the increase in state-legislated do-not-call
registries, and the do-not-call proceedings already underway by the FTC. 52 The FCC
acknowledged at the time the need to address the "interplay" between its proceedings
and those of the FTC.
53
When the FTC enacted the Amended TSR and adopted do-not-call registry
requirements in 2003, the FCC had not concluded its own do-not-call proceeding.
Impatient with the FCC, Congress enacted legislation directing the agency to finish its
rulemaking within six months and "maximize consistency" with the FTC's Amended
TSR.54  In 2003, the FCC completed its proceeding and adopted do-not-call
requirements that incorporated the FTC's national do-not-call registry.
55
Like the FTC's rule, the FCC's do-not-call rule prohibits telephone solicitations to
subscribers to the national registry. 56  The rule was intended to supplement the
company-specific do-not-call requirements adopted in 1992, 57 which the FCC also
decided to retain when it adopted the do-not-call registry in 2003. 58 In addition, the
new rule applies to entities outside of the FTC's jurisdiction, such as common carriers,
banks, insurance companies and airlines.
59
The FCC do-not-call registry requirements only apply to "telephone solicitation[s]"
defined as "telephone call[s] or message[s] for the purpose of encouraging the purchase
or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services." 60  The definition
specifically excludes calls made with the "prior express invitation or permission" of the
recipient,6 1 and those made to recipients with whom the caller has an "established
business relationship." 62 The definition also specifically exempts calls made "by or on
Proposed Rulemaking and Memorandum and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 17,459, 17,487-88 (Sept. 12, 2002).
52. See id. For law review treatment of state telemarketing regulation, see generally Patricia Pattison and
Anthony F. McGann, State Telemarketing Legislation: A Whole Lotta Law Goin' On!, 3 WYO. L. REV. 167,
176-92 (2003); Shannon, supra note 48, at 392-93,409-13.
53. Id.
54. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, 108 Pub. L. No. 10, 117 Stat. 557, § 3(2003).
55. Rules and Regulations, Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,152, 44,154-55 (July 25, 2003) (codified
at 47 C.F.R. parts 64 and 68).
56. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) (WEST, Westlaw current through Dec. 28, 2005).
57. Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Second Order
on Reconsideration, 2005 WL 418189, 6 (Feb. 18, 2005).
58. Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,156-57 (stating that the "company-specific do-not-call rules will
complement the national do-not-call registry by providing consumers with an additional option for managing
telemarketing calls"). In addition, the FCC decided to reduce the retention period for individual do-not-call
requests by consumers to specific companies from ten year to five years. Id. at 44,156. The current version
of the FCC telemarketing rule reflects this change. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) (WEST, Westlaw, current through
Dec. 28, 2005).
59. Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,145.
60. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(9) (WEST, Westlaw, current through Dec. 28, 2005). This definition tracks
the language in the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3).
61. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(9)(i) (West, WESTLAW, current through Dec. 28, 2005).
62. Id. § 64.1200(f)(9)(ii). The FCC defined an "established business relationship" as "limited in
duration to eighteen (18) months from any purchase or transaction and three (3) months from any inquiry or
application." Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,148. In addition, the FCC concluded that the do-not-call registry
requirements do not apply to calls made to individuals with whom the telemarketer has a "personal
relationship" such as calls made to "friends and acquaintances." Id. at 44,149. The determination of whether
a call fits within this exception is circumstantial and based in part on whether the recipient considers the
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behalf of tax exempt nonprofit organizations." 63 In a 2005 order, the FCC explained
that survey and marketing research calls, along with and political and religious calls, are
not covered by the rule.
64
C Summary of Regulatory Framework
Effective January 1, 2005, telemarketers subject to the FCC or FTC do-not-call
rules were required to access the do-not-call registry and delete subscribing telephone
numbers from their own calling lists once every 31 days.65 Moreover, subscribing to
the registry does not guarantee elimination of all unwanted telemarketing calls for
consumers. Under the FCC and FTC do-not-call rules, telemarketers can call a
subscriber on the list with whom they have an established business relationship unless
the subscriber has asked them not to call. In addition, noncommercial callers are
exempt from the requirements of the do-not-call registry under both the FTC and FCC
rules.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
The constitutionality of the national do-not-call registry raises First Amendment
issues with broad implications for regulation of commercial telemarketing in general
along with other modes of delivering targeted, commercial messages including
electronic mail. And, an analysis of the constitutionality of the do-not-call registry must
be placed within a relevant First Amendment framework, including the commercial
speech doctrine as it applies to the regulation of commercial communications. Two
critical constitutional issues surface here.
First, telemarketing regulation in general raises the issue of whether the First
Amendment tolerates more extensive restriction of direct-marketing communications
than mass media advertising. 66 Commercial messages delivered by direct means such
as door-to-door, telephone and direct mail-referred to as "point-to-point media" by
one commentator 67-seemingly implicate personal privacy and cost-shifting concerns
more so than mass-mediated advertising carried by newspapers, magazines, or radio and
telemarketer a friend or acquaintance. Id.
63. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(9)(iii) (West, WESTLAW, current through Dec. 28, 2005).
64. Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Second Order
on Reconsideration, 2005 WL 418189, 6 (Feb. 10, 2005). In addition, the FCC decided that the do-not-call
registry requirements apply to telemarketing calls selling newspapers and do not violate the First Amendment
in that regard. Id. II (concluding that the "right to distribute newspapers is afforded First Amendment
protection" but that "a call from a telemarketer to an unwilling listener in their home for the purpose of selling
a newspaper subscription" is commercial speech).
65. Restrictions on Telemarketing and Telephone Solicitation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2)(i)(D) (West,
WESTLAW, current through Dec. 28, 2005) (FCC rule); Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. §
310.4(b)(3)(iv) (West, WESTLAW, current through Dec. 28, 2005) (FTC rule).
66. See Ian Ayres and Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 124-27 (2003); Rita
Marie Cain, Call Up and Just Say 'Buy "-Telemarketing and the Regulatory Environment, 31 AM. BUS. L.J.
641, 643-49 (1993)(1993a); Rita Marie Cain, Don't Reach Out and Touch Us Anymore, 7 J. DIRECT
MARKETING 60,64-66 (1993) (Cain 1993b); Nadel, supra note 14, at 104-06.
67. Nadel, supra note 14, at 105 (referring to such "point-to-point media" as "mail and phone
communications").
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television programming. 6 8  For instance, consumers typically can decide which
newspapers, magazines or television programs to purchase or otherwise allow into their
homes but cannot, for instance, always control who knocks on the door, calls on the
telephone, transmits a telefax to their machine, or sends them regular or electronic
mail.
69
In addition, door-to-door and telephone solicitations may implicate privacy
concerns to a higher degree than mail or e-mail. For instance, a knock at the door or
ringing telephone demands immediate attention, while mail and e-mail can be opened
and read whenever the recipient chooses to do so. 70  In addition, commercial
solicitations delivered by point-to-point means, such as cellular telephones and telefax
machines, can result in unwanted charges or other out-of-pocket costs to the recipient.
7 1
A second constitutional issue raised by telemarketing regulation is the extent to
which the First Amendment tolerates regulations that restrict or otherwise regulate
commercial messages but not noncommercial ones.72 Commentators on this issue have
suggested that targeting commercial messages for regulation can be constitutionally
problematic without a sufficient public policy goal related to the commercial nature of
the regulated communication.73 Although the Supreme Court has consistently held that
protected commercial speech falls below the level of First Amendment protection
afforded fully-protected noncommercial speech,74 the Court has also made it clear that
commercial speech cannot be constitutionally regulated on that ground 
alone. 75
Instead, the Supreme Court has held that the government must demonstrate a
substantial governmental interest that is directly advanced by a narrowly-tailored
regulation in order to constitutionally regulate protected commercial speech. 76 In the
telemarketing context, the more specific issue raised is whether regulations that restrict
some unsolicited telemarketing calls but not others are a constitutional means of
addressing a public policy goal such as protecting consumer privacy. Either type of
telephone call can produce the same end result for recipients-an intrusive interruption
or unwanted cost, or both.
68. See Ayres and Funk, supra note 66, at 124 (citing authorities); Nadel, supra note 14, at 104.
69. See Ayres and Funk, supra note 66, at 124-25 (calling "[c]ommunications received at home the most
intrusive kind of speech") (citing authorities).
70. Id. at 109 (describing "sales calls" as "more invasive (and annoying) than spain and direct mail"
because "[consumers] can at least choose at what point during the day [they] want to sort through their [mail
and] email") (citing authorities).
71. These costs might be monetary costs associated with receiving communications on a cellular
telephone or telefax machine, for instance. In addition, unwanted solicitations delivered via other means such
as telephone that might not involve a monetary cost to the recipient may result in intangible costs such as
inconvenience and annoyance, and time spent dealing with unwanted telemarketing calls. See Ayres and
Funk, supra note 66, at 78, 83-87 (discussing "externalized costs" of direct marketing those that are shifted
by the caller to the recipient including time spent sorting through unwanted solicitation, for example).
72. See id. at 126-27; Nadel, supra note 14, at 109-11; Cain, supra note 66, at 642-49.
73. See, e.g., Nadel, supra note 14, at 110-11. As pointed out by Professor Nadel, the FCC recognized
this issue as early as 1980 in official policy stating that "exempting calls made for political and charitable
solicitations or survey research purposes from regulations applicable to commercial sales calls would ...
appear to raise serious constitutional questions" unless there is evidence that noncommercial calls are less
objectionable to consumers than commercial ones. Id. at 111 (citations omitted).
74. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
75. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419-20, 424-26, 428-29 (1993).
76. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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In light of these two major constitutional issues, this section of the article first looks
at the First Amendment commercial speech doctrine including the Central Hudson
analysis and the constitutional impact of exemptions and exceptions in regulations of
protected commercial speech. Then, the section looks more closely at the constitutional
issues raised by regulating point-to-point communications including door-to-door and
direct mail solicitation. This section provides a foundation for the sections on
telemarketing regulation that follow.
A. The First Amendment Commercial Speech Doctrine
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
the United States Supreme Court squarely held for the first time that the First
Amendment protects truthful, non-misleading speech that does nothing more than
propose a lawful commercial transaction. 77 In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court
specifically struck down a state statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising
prescription drug prices. 78  A consumer group had challenged the statute in federal
district court and alleged that the statute violated their First Amendment right to receive
price advertising from pharmacists who would have advertised but for the statute.
79
Virginia argued that the advertising ban served to protect the professional reputation of
pharmacists and prevent consumers from making purchase decisions based on price
alone without considering other factors like quality of service offered by pharmacists.
80
The Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court agreed that consumers have a strong
constitutional right to receive truthful, non-misleading information about lawful goods
and services from willing commercial speakers. Justice Blackmun wrote on this point:
"Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is
the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its
recipients both." 8 1  The Court characterized free-flowing commercial information as
beneficial for facilitating informed consumer decisions in the marketplace.
82
77. 425 U.S. 748, 762-63, 771-71 (1976). Justice Blackmun, who delivered the majority opinion, wrote:
Our questions is whether speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,' is
so removed from any 'exposition of ideas,' and from 'truth, science, morality, and arts in general,
in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,' that it lacks all
protection [of the First Amendment]. Our answer is that it is not.
Id. at 762 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion for the Virginia State Board Court and
explained the types of commercial speech that fall outside the First Amendment. Id. at 771-73. The issue in
the case, he explained, was whether a state regulation can "completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its
disseminators and its recipients." Id. at 773.
78. A section of the Virginia Code stated that a licensed pharmacist who "publishes, advertises or
promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate
or credit terms for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which may be
dispensed only by prescription." Id. at 749-50, 750 n.2 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974)).
79. Id. at 753-54.
80. Id. at 767-68.
81. Id. at 756 (citations omitted).
82. Writing for the Court on this point, Justice Blackmun explained:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in
large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public
interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the
free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
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In applying these principles, the Court found the Virginia statute was
constitutionally problematic because it prevented consumers from receiving truthful,
non-misleading product information-the price of prescription drugs-that consumers
would likely consider useful in making their purchase decisions. Quite simply, the
Court was not willing to allow Virginia to block this information from consumers as a
means of manipulating their purchase decisions. 83 In addition, the Court found nothing
inherently unprofessional about truthful, non-misleading price advertising by
pharmacists and noted that the state remained free to directly regulate specific acts of
misconduct by licensed pharmacists. 84
The Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court suggested that even commercial speech
protected under the First Amendment could be constitutionally regulated under some
circumstances but found it unnecessary to explain this further. 85 However, in the 1980
case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
86York, the Court chose to confront that issue directly. In Central Hudson, the Court set
out the following "four-step analysis" to determine the constitutionality of a regulation
of commercial speech:
[First], we must determine whether the [regulated] expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. [Second], we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine [third] whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and [fourth] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
Id. at 765.
83. Id. at 770-71. Calling the ban on price advertising "highly paternalistic," the Virginia State Board
Court suggested an alternative. For the Court, Justice Blackmun wrote: "That alternative is to assume that
this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication." Id. at 770.
84. See id. at 769, 771-772. Justice Blackmun pointed out for the Court that Virginia had made no claim
that "prescription drug price advertisements are forbidden because they are false or misleading in any way"
nor that "the transactions proposed in the forbidden [price] advertisements are themselves illegal in any way."
Id. at 771, 772.
In addition, the Court concluded the state should address specific acts of professional misconduct by
pharmacists as opposed to imposing a prophylactic ban on price advertising. See id. at 770. For the Court,
Justice Blackmun wrote, "Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its
pharmacists .... But it may not [regulate in this context] by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely
lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering." Id. In a later case, the Supreme Court held similarly
that a state could not constitutionally ban all price advertising for routine services provided by lawyers
because, in part, the Court found nothing inherently misleading about such advertising that would justify a
prophylactic ban. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 372-75 (1977). Similarly, the Court ruled that
a state could not constitutionally prohibit all illustrations in lawyer advertising on similar grounds. Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 649 (1985).
85. The Court did not address other issues such as the scope of constitutionally permissible regulation of
commercial speech disseminated by regulated electronic broadcast media. Id. at 773. On this point, the Court
cited-but did not discuss-a decision by a federal district court that had upheld a federal ban on broadcast
cigarette advertising as constitutional and had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1972 without opinion.
Id. (citing Capitol Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. 1971), ajfd sub nom. Capital Broad. Co. v.
Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972)).
86. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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interest. 87
The Central Hudson Court used its new analysis in the case to strike down a state
ban on promotional advertising for electricity by utility companies. 88  Applying the
analysis to the facts, the Court concluded first that the regulation prohibited protected
commercial speech and therefore needed to withstand scrutiny under the remaining
three conjunctive factors. 89 Under the second factor, the Court concluded the state had
demonstrated a substantial governmental interest in promoting energy conservation.
90
Thus, the ultimate constitutional decision turned on whether the regulation directly
advanced that interest (direct-advancement requirement) and, if so, was no more
extensive than necessary (narrow-tailoring requirement).
9 1
Under the third Central Hudson factor, the Court concluded that banning
promotional advertising for electricity served the governmental interest in energy
conservation in a direct and material way. 92  In doing so, the Court assumed that
advertising increased demand and consumption and that limiting advertising for
electricity would dampen demand. 93  Nonetheless, the Court found the ban failed to
satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement under the fourth factor.94  The state failed to
convince the Court that a ban on all promotional advertising for electricity was
necessary and that a less extensive regulation would not suffice. 95  For instance, the
Court suggested, promoting electricity over less-efficient sources of energy might
promote overall energy conservation. 96
After establishing the Central Hudson analysis in 1980, the Court subsequently
proceeded to apply the test with varying degrees of rigor, but in 1995, the Court began
to consistently tighten the application of the final two factors. 97 From 1995 to present,
87. Id.
88. Id. at 571-72. The ban was the result of a policy statement issued by the Public Service Commission
of the State of New York finding that the supply of electricity furnished by interconnected utility companies
in the state were expected to be insufficient to meet consumer demand and that promotional advertising for
electricity would undermine public policy promoting energy conservation. Id. at 559-60. The Commission
had ordered the Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. to halt all promotional advertising for electricity, which
the company challenged on First Amendment grounds in the case. Id.
89. Id. at 566-68.
90. Id. at 568-69. The Court also found that the state had a sufficiently substantial interest in ensuring
that electricity rates be fair and efficient. Id.
91. Id. at 569-571. The last two steps of the Central Hudson test involve an analysis of the
"relationship" between each asserted governmental interest and the advertising regulation under review. Id. at
569.
92. Id. at 569. The Court rejected the argument, however, that the advertising ban directly served the
asserted interest in promoting fair and efficient prices for electricity. Id. As to that interest, the Court
concluded that the "link between the advertising prohibition and the [utility company's] rate structure is, at
most, tenuous." Id.
93. Id. (assuming that "there is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for
electricity"). As grounds for this assumption, the Court merely stated that "Central Hudson would not contest
the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would increase its sales." Id.
94. Id. at 569-71.
95. Id. at 570-71. The majority stated, "In absence of a showing that more limited speech regulation
would be ineffective, we cannot approve the complete suppression of Central Hudson's advertising." Id. at
571.
96. Id. at 570. For instance, Central Hudson had argued that but for the ban, it would advertise the use of
electrical heat pumps as a more energy-efficient alternative to other sources of heat. Id.
97. See, e.g., Michael Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
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the Court has used the Central Hudson analysis in six cases and only once upheld a
challenged regulation-Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., a lawyer solicitation case. 98 In
the other five cases, the Court ruled unconstitutional a federal ban on publishing alcohol
content percentages on beer labels,99 a state ban on retail price advertising by liquor
retailers, 100  a federal broadcast ban on casino gambling advertising, 10 1  state
restrictions on outdoor and point-of-sale tobacco product advertising, 0 2 and a federal
ban on direct-to-consumer advertising for compounded prescription drugs. 1
03
In a 1999 case, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, Inc. v. United
States, the Supreme Court summarized its current interpretation of the third and fourth
factors of the Central Hudson analysis. 104 Under the third factor, the Court explained,
the regulation at issue must "directly and materially advance the asserted governmental
interest." 105 This requires the government to "demonstrate that the harms that it recites
are real and that [the regulation] will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."'
10 6
Under the narrow tailoring requirement, the Court explained, the regulation at issue
need not meet the "least restrictive means" standard that applies to a restriction of fully-
protected speech. 107 Instead, the regulation must create "a fit that is reasonable" with
the asserted governmental interest. 18In other words, the Court instructed, the
regulation need not be the "single best disposition [but one] whose scope is in
proportion to the interest served."'
10 9
B. Disparate Regulatory Treatment of Speech Types
Under the Central Hudson analysis, the Supreme Court has struck down
commercial speech regulations when exemptions or conflicting provisions undermine
their effectiveness in advancing the asserted regulatory goal to a direct and material
degree. These issues arise in two contexts. First, regulations that treat commercial
speech differently than noncommercial speech can be constitutionally problematic.
The Constitutional Impact of Lorillard Tobacco, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 267, 272-84 (2003); Michael Hoefges
and Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, "Vice " Advertising Under the Supreme Court's Commercial Speech Doctrine:
The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 345, 363-89 (2000); Jef I. Richards,
Is 44 Liquormart a Turning Point?, 16 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 156, 158-61 (1997); Daniel E. Troy,
Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech, 16 YALEJ. ON REG. 85, 138-42 (1999).
98. 515 U.S. 618 (1995). For a discussion of this case and its impact on lawyers advertising and
solicitation, see John Phillips, Six Years After Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: The Continual Erosion of First
Amendment Rights, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197 (2001).
99. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
100. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
101. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
102. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
103. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
104. 527 U.S. at 188-89.
105. Id. at 188.
106. Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993)). The Court also wrote that "the
regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's
purpose." Id. (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980)).
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). In other
words, the scope of the regulation must be "in proportion to the interest served." Id.
109. Id. (quoting Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
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This is an important issue because the do-not-call registry requirements only apply to
commercial telemarketing calls. Second, regulations that distinguish among types of
commercial speech within a category can be constitutionally problematic as well. This
also is an important issue because the do-not-call registry requirements exempt some
forms of commercial telemarketing calls. The overriding question becomes whether the
regulatory lines that have been drawn are rational and supported by evidence to meet
the direct-advancement requirement of the Central Hudson analysis.
In Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., decided in 1993,110 the Supreme Court
ruled unconstitutional a city code provision that effectively banned commercial
newsracks on public sidewalks.Il As enforced by the city, the provision prohibited
newsracks distributing "commercial handbills" including free publications containing
real estate listings for sale, for instance. 112 However, the city code specifically allowed
newsracks selling "newspapers" as that term was interpreted and applied by the city113
manager. A group of publishers who were denied permits for "commercial"
newsracks challenged the permitting scheme on First Amendment grounds and
prevailed at the federal trial court level. 114 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals, Sixth Circuit, affirmed. 115
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties agreed the newsrack ordinance
restricted protected commercial speech. 116 Therefore, the Court applied the remaining
three Central Hudson factors. 117 Under the second factor, the publishers agreed with
the city that there was a substantial governmental interest in promoting safety and
110. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
111. Id. at 413-15 (quoting CINCINNATI, MUNICIPAL CODE § 714-1-C (1992)).
112. Id. at 413-14, 414 n.2., 414 n.3. Under the city code, it was unlawful to "hand out or distribute or
sell any commercial handbill in any public place." Id. at 414 n.3 (quoting CINCINNATI, MUNICIPAL CODE §
714-23 (1992)). The city code defined a "commercial handbill" as follows:
[A]ny printed or written matter, dodger, circular, leaflet, pamphlet, paper booklet or any other
printed or otherwise reproduced original or copies of any matter of literature:
(a) Which advertises for sale any merchandise, product, commodity or thing; or
(b) Which directs attention to any business or mercantile or commercial establishment, or
other activity, for the purpose of directly promoting the interest thereof by sales; or
(c) Which directs attention to or advertises any meeting, theatrical performance, exhibition or
event of any kind for which an admission fee is charged for the purpose of private gain or
profit.
Id. at 414 n.2 (quoting CINCINNATI, MUNICIPAL CODE § 714-1 -C (1992)).
113. Id. at 419-20 (quoting CINCINNATI, MUNICIPAL CODE § 862-1 (1992)). The term "newspapers" was
not defined in the city code. Id. Instead, the city manager determined which publications qualified as
"commercial handbills" and which publications qualified as "newspapers" when newsrack licenses were
requested from the city. Id. The city manager had determined that "newspapers" were daily or weekly
publications that "primarily present coverage of, and commentary, on current events." Id. at 420 (citation
omitted).
114. Id. at 412.
115. Discovery Network, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 946 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1991).
116. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416.
117. Id. at 424. The majority noted the "difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin
commercial speech in a distinct category." Id. at 419; see also id. at 420 (noting the "absence of a categorical
definition of the difference between 'newspapers' and 'commercial handbills' in the code provisions at issue
in the case). However, the majority decided to avoid the problem of defining commercial and noncommercial
speech. See id. at 424 (stating that "for the purpose of deciding this case, we assume that the speech barred
from Cincinnati's sidewalks is what we have labeled 'core' commercial speech and that no such speech is
found in publications that are allowed to use newsracks").
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aesthetics of city streets and sidewalks. 18 The decision therefore turned on the
contested direct-advancement and narrow-tailoring requirements of the Central Hudson
analysis.
Turning to the third factor, the Discovery Network Court found that refusing to
permit commercial newsracks while allowing noncommercial ones did not directly
advance the interests in promoting public safety and aesthetics. 119  First, the Court
concluded there was nothing inherent about commercial newsracks that rendered them
any more of an "eyesore" or safety concern than noncommercial newsracks.12 0  Thus,
there was no theoretical correlation between the commercial-noncommercial distinction
in the ordinance and the city's asserted regulatory goals. Nor was there any factual
support for the distinction either, the Court concluded. The evidence in the record
indicated that only sixty-two commercial newsracks had been denied permits under the
ordinance, while between 1,500 and 2,000 noncommercial newsracks had been
permitted. 121 Thus, the Court concluded, the proliferation of permitted noncommercial
newsracks presented the far more serious and substantial threat to public safety and city
aesthetics than commercial newsracks. 122
Although it was unnecessary to the ruling, the Court also found the newsrack
ordinance failed the narrow-tailoring requirement of the fourth Central Hudson
factor. 123 For the majority, Justice Stevens characterized the ordinance as a "sweeping
ban that bars from [the] sidewalks a whole class of constitutionally protected
speech."1 24 Thus, the ordinance burdened protected commercial speech too extensively
to be constitutional in light of its marginal effectiveness in achieving the asserted
governmental goals. 1
25
The newsrack ordinance in Discovery Network was constitutionally problematic
because of the regulatory line drawn between commercial and noncommercial
118. Id. at 416.
119. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 424. The Court thus found the city's disparate treatment of
commercial and noncommercial newsracks unrelated to the goals of promoting safer and less-cluttered
sidewalks. Id. at 424 (stating that the "categorical ban on commercial newsracks place[d] too much
importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech" and that the "distinction
[bore] no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted").
120. Id. at 425-26. The Court noted that the city has "not asserted an interest in preventing commercial
harms by regulating [commercial newsracks], which is, of course, the typical reason why commercial speech
can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech." Id. at 426 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 417-18. The Court concluded that the city had overemphasized the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech and, thus, had "seriously underestimate[d] the value of commercial
speech." Id. at 419.
122. Id. at 426 (referring to commercial newsracks as the "greater culprit").
123. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 430.
124. Id. The Court rejected the city's argument that the ban on commercial newsracks was a "legitimate"
time, place or manner restriction because it was not content-neutral. Id. at 430. For the Court, Justice Stevens
wrote: "Under the city's newsrack policy, whether any particular newsrack falls within the ban is determined
by the content of the publication resting inside that newsrack. Thus, by any commonsense understanding of
the term, the ban in this case is 'content based."' Id. at 429.
125. In a prior case, a plurality of the Supreme Court struck down a city billboard ordinance that exempted
onsite signs with commercial messages related to the commercial use of the premises. Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 513-14, 521 (1981). Justice White, who delivered the judgment of the
Court, wrote "The city does not explain how or why noncommercial billboards located in places where
commercial billboards are permitted would be more threatening to safe driving or would detract more from
the beauty of the city." Id. at 513.
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newsracks. In two subsequent cases, the Court struck down regulations of protected
commercial speech because of disparate treatment of similar types of protected
commercial speech within a category. In both of these cases, irrational exemptions
rendered the regulatory schemes unconstitutional according to a majority of the
Supreme Court.
In 1995, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company, Inc., 126 the Court struck down
provisions in the Federal Alcohol Administration Act ("FAAA") that prohibited the
publication of alcohol content percentages on beer labels as unconstitutional. 127 The
beer manufacturer, Coors Brewing Company, challenged the label ban on First
Amendment grounds and prevailed before the federal district court and United States
Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. 128 On appeal, the Supreme Court applied the Central
Hudson analysis and affirmed. 1
29
There was no dispute on appeal that the challenged provisions in the FAAA
restricted protected commercial speech 130 or that the remainder of the Central Hudson
analysis therefore applied. 13 1  Under the second Central Hudson factor, the Court
agreed with the government that there was a substantial regulatory interest in preventing
beer manufacturers from competing on the basis of high alcohol content. 132 The federal
government convinced the Court that the so-called "strength war" marketing by beer
manufacturers would contribute to both increased rates of high-alcohol beer
consumption, and social costs related to alcohol consumption. 1
33
However, the government failed to convince the Coors Brewing Court that the label
ban satisfied the direct-advancement requirement under the third Central Hudson
factor. 134 The Court found that banning alcohol percentage information on beer labels
was irrational in light of other federal provisions that allowed the same information on
labeling for distilled spirits and actually required the information on labeling for wine
products exceeding fourteen percent alcohol content. 135  For the Coors Brewing
majority, Justice Thomas wrote: "[T]he irrationality of this unique and puzzling
126. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
127. Id. at 478-80 (reviewing the FAAA as codified at 27 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.). The regulation applied
to "beer" and "ale" products. Id. at 481 (citing implementing regulations enacted by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, 27 C.F.R. § 7.26(a) (1994)). The regulation was applied to prohibit numerical
indications of alcohol content along with descriptive phrases such as "strong," "full strength," and "high
proof," among others. Id. (citing implementing regulations enacted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, 27 C.F.R. § 7.29(0 (1994)).
128. Id. at 479-80.
129. Id. at 480.
130. Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 481, 483.
131. Id. at482.
132. Id. at 485. However, the Court rejected the federal government's argument that it also had a
sufficiently substantial interest in "preserving state authority" to implement "alcohol-related policies." Id. at
485-86.
133. Id. at 485 ("We have no reason to think that strength wars, if they were to occur, would not produce
the type of social harm that the Government hopes to prevent.").
134. Id. at 486-90.
135. Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 489 (citing 27 C.F.R. §§ 5.37, 4.36 (1994)). In addition, the Court noted,
the FAAA and its enforcement regulations allowed beer manufacturers to publish alcohol content percentages
in advertising in all but eighteen states. Id. at 488. Under the FAAA and related regulations, beer
manufacturers were permitted to advertise alcohol content in states that did not ban such information in beer
advertisements. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 205(0(2) (1994), 27 C.F.R. § 7.50 (1994)). Only eighteen states
banned alcohol content in beer advertising. Id.
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regulatory framework ensures that the labeling ban will fail to achieve [the goal of
combating strength wars]. There is little chance that [the ban] can directly and
materially advance its aim, while other provisions . . .undermine and counteract its
effects." 
136
Although it was unnecessary to the constitutional ruling, the Court also concluded
that the beer label ban failed the narrow-tailoring requirement under the fourth Central
Hudson factor. The majority found that regulatory options such as imposing a cap on
beer alcohol content or a tax on high-alcohol beer, for instance, were available to curb
consumption of high-alcohol beer and would not burden protected commercial
speech.137 It was clear that the Court was not tolerant of a ban on speech when direct
controls on the product itself were regulatory options.
In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, Inc. v. United States, decided in
1999,138 the Supreme Court found another federal regulation of commercial speech
irrational and unconstitutional under the Central Hudson analysis. In that case, the
Court ruled that part of a federal ban on gambling advertising carried by licensed
broadcast media was unconstitutional. 139 Exemptions allowed broadcast advertising for
some forms of legalized gambling including state-operated lotteries, Native American-
operated casinos, and gambling operations run by non-profit organizations. 140 In
addition, as mentioned, the ban only applied to gambling advertising aired by licensed
radio and television broadcasters. 141
A Louisiana-based coalition of broadcasters challenged the ban in federal district
court arguing that the provisions unconstitutionally restricted them from broadcasting
advertising for legalized private casinos in Louisiana and adjoining Mississippi. 142 A
Louisiana federal district judge upheld the ban under the Central Hudson analysis. 1
43
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, affirmed the ruling 144 despite a
136. Id. at 489. The government did not present sufficient evidence to convince the Court otherwise. Id.
at 489-90 ("The Government did not offer any convincing evidence that the labeling ban has inhibited
strength wars."). The Court pointed out that while the government had presented "anecdotal evidence and
educated guesses to suggest that competition on the basis of alcohol content is occurring today and that [the]
ban has constrained strength wars that otherwise would burst out of control," such "various tidbits" were
insufficient to "overcome the irrationality of the regulatory scheme." Id. at 490.
137. Id. at 490-91.
138. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
139. The federal statute prohibited "any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance ...." Id. at
177 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994)). The broadcast advertising ban on gambling was part of the original
Communications Act of 1934. Id. at 177 (citing 48 Stat. 1088).
140. Id. at 178-79 (discussing specifically the various exemptions enacted by Congress over the years to
the broadcast ban for gambling advertising).
141. Id. at 177.
142. Id. at 180-83 (discussing the proceedings below). For a detailed law review discussion and
commentary of the proceedings below in the case, see Hoefges and Rivera-Sanchez, supra note 97, at 375-82.
143. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 975, 976 (E.D. La. 1994).
144. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 149 F.3d 334, 335, 341 (5th Cir. 1998). The
United States Fifth Circuit had upheld the decision of the federal district court in a previous decision that was
vacated on appeal to the United States Supreme Court and remanded for further consideration. Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 69 F.3d 1296, 1298 (1995), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 519
U.S. 801 (1996) (remanding to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the decision in 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)).
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conflicting ruling by the Ninth Circuit the previous year in a Nevada case.145
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court utilized the Central Hudson analysis
to test the constitutionality of the federal broadcast ban on gambling advertising. 
146
The parties agreed that the ban prevented the broadcasters from airing truthful and non-
misleading advertising about lawful casino gambling, which is protected commercial
speech. 147 Moving to the second factor of the analysis, the Supreme Court agreed that
the federal government had sufficiently substantial interests in curbing social costs
related to gambling and in supporting the policy of states that prohibit gambling
including casino gambling. 148 However, the Court found the broadcast advertising ban
failed both the direct-advancement and narrow-tailoring requirements of the third and
fourth Central Hudson factors and was unconstitutional.
Under the direct-advancement requirement of the third factor, the Greater New
Orleans Court found the broadcast ban irrational and too "pierced by exemptions and
inconsistencies" to be a sufficiently effective means of accomplishing the asserted
regulatory interests. 149 For the majority, Justice Stevens wrote: "[T]he government is
committed to prohibiting accurate product information... [but] only when conveyed
over certain forms of media and for certain types of gambling ... despite the fact that
messages about the availability of such gambling are being conveyed over the airwaves
by other speakers."' 150  There was no evidence in the case of a significant correlation
between broadcast advertising for private casino gambling and the government's
145. Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
1115 (1998). In the Fifth Circuit's 1998 opinion in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, the appeals court
acknowledged the conflict with the Ninth Circuit in Valley Broadcasting. 149 F.3d at 335 n.2. In its opinion
in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, the Supreme Court also noted the conflict between the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits. 527 U.S. at 183.
146. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1999) (concluding
that Central Hudson analysis was appropriate test in the case); id. at 184-95 (application of Central Hudson
analysis to facts of case).
147. Id. at 184. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens suggested that private gambling advertising
probably contributes to the public debate on legalized gambling in addition to simply advertising lawful
gambling activities. See id. at 184-85. On this point, he wrote:
[T]he proposed commercial messages would convey information-whether taken favorably or
unfavorably by the audience-about an activity that is the subject of intense public debate in many
communities. In addition, the ... broadcasts presumably would disseminate accurate information
as to the operation of market competitors, such as pay-out ratios, which can benefit listeners by
informing their consumption choices and fostering price competition. Thus, even if the
broadcasters' interest in conveying these messages is entirely pecuniary, the interests of, and
benefit to, the audience may be broader.
Id.
148. Id. at 184-87. The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Court was not overwhelmed by the
government's argument and somewhat grudgingly agreed that these interests were sufficiently substantial.
For the majority, Justice Stevens wrote:
We can accept the characterization of these two interests as "substantial," but that conclusion is by
no means self-evident. No one seriously doubts the Federal Government may assert a legitimate
and substantial interest in alleviating the societal ills [of gambling], or in assisting like-minded
States to do the same. But in the judgment of both the Congress and many state legislatures, the
social costs that support the suppression of gambling are offset, and sometimes outweighed, by
countervailing policy considerations, primarily in the form of economic benefits.
Id. at 186-87 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 190.
150. Id. at 191. Justice Stevens cautioned that laws that discriminate among commercial speakers
"conveying virtually the identical messages [are] in serious tensions with the principles undergirding the First
Amendment." Id. at 193-94.
[Vol. 32:1
2005] Telemarketing Regulation and the Commercial Speech Doctrine 69
asserted interest in curbing social harms of gambling. 1
51
The Court also concluded that the broadcast advertising ban failed the narrow
tailoring requirement because more direct, non-speech regulatory means were
available. 152 In other words, the government could directly regulate the operations of
private casinos to try and curb social harms associated with excessive and compulsive
casino gambling. 153 For instance, the Court suggested, the government could restrict or
limit the availability of credit and cash machines in casinos, establish mandatory betting
and jackpot limits, and limit casino admission. 154  These regulations would better
address the asserted regulatory goals without restricting protected speech.
In order for a regulation that focuses on commercial speech over noncommercial
speech to withstand constitutional scrutiny, it seems clear that the governmental interest
must correlate with the commercial nature of the regulated speech. In other words, the
regulatory choice to restrict commercial speech but not noncommercial speech must be
rational in light of the regulatory goal at stake, and that decision may not be
constitutionally grounded merely on the intermediate level of protection afforded
commercial speech under the First Amendment. That seems to be the clear lesson of
Discovery Network. Similarly, the decision to regulate some forms of commercial
speech within a category but not others also must be rational in light of the
governmental interest or interests at stake. That seems equally clear from Coors
Brewing and Greater New Orleans Broadcasting.
C. Regulations of Point-to-Point Communication: Door-to-Door and Direct Mail
Regulations of point-to-point communications such as door-to-door and direct mail
solicitation seem highly analogous to telemarketing regulation including the national
do-not-call registry requirements. 1 Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on
151. On this point, Justice Stevens wrote for the majority:
We need not resolve the question whether any lack of evidence in the record fails to satisfy the
standard of proof under Central Hudson, however, because the flaw in the Government's case is
more fundamental: The operation of [the federal statute] and its attendant regulatory scheme is so
pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.
Id. at 190 (citing Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 488).
152. Id. at 188, 193-94. For the majority, Justice Stevens wrote that the "fourth part of the [Central
Hudson] test complements the direct-advancement inquiry of the third part, asking whether the speech
restriction is not more extensive than necessary to serve the interests that support it." Id. The majority
opinion seemed to address the third and fourth factors combined as to each of the asserted governmental
interests. Id. at 188-95. However, after setting out the requirements of the third and fourth factors, the
majority opinion specifically indicate that "as applied to [the facts of the case], [the challenged ban] cannot
satisfy these standards," which indicate the majority had concluded that the ban failed both of the final
Central Hudson inquiries. See id. at 188 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 192.
154. Id.
155. See Meacham, supra note 34, at 74-76 (discussing Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970)
(direct mail case), Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (door-to-door case) and Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (door-to-door solicitation case), and
concluding that "the type of restriction placed upon telemarketers by the establishment of a national 'do-not-
call' list is similar to several restrictive activities that the Supreme Court has previously held constitutional
against First Amendment challenges"); James Sweet, Opting-Out of Commercial Telemarketing: The
Constitutionality of the National Do-Not-Call Registry, 70 TENN. L. REV. 921, 954 (2003) (noting that the
Supreme Court had not yet addressed regulations of telemarketing but had "addressed the analogous mediums
of door-to-door and direct mail solicitations"); Jared Strauss, The Do-Not-Call List's Big Hang-Up, 10 RICH.
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the constitutionality of a telemarketing regulation, the Court has addressed
constitutional issues in First Amendment challenges to regulations of door-to-door and
direct mail solicitation that are relevant in the telemarketing context. This section looks
first at door-to-door solicitation cases and then direct mail solicitation cases decided by
the Supreme Court.
In Martin v. City of Struthers, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a city
ordinance that criminalized door-to-door distribution of "handbills, circulars or otherS .,,156
advertisements. Thelma Martin, a Jehovah's witness, had been convicted under the
ordinance for distributing door-to-door religious leaflets and challenged her conviction
on First Amendment grounds. 157  In overturning her conviction, the Court found the
ordinance problematic constitutionally because it prevented speakers like Martin from
reaching householders who had no objection to receiving door-to-door
communications. 
15 8
For the Martin majority, Justice Black wrote: "Freedom to distribute information
to every citizen where he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to preservation of a free
society that, [with some exceptions], it must be fully preserved."' 159  Regulations, he
explained further, had to be crafted with "due respect for the constitutional rights of
those desiring to distribute literature and those desiring to receive it, as well as those
who choose to exclude such distributers (sic) from the home." 160 Justice Black
suggested that a regulation allowing door-to-door solicitations except at homes
displaying a no-solicitation sign would pass constitutional muster because solicitors still
would be permitted to communicate with non-objecting householders. 161
In 1980, the Supreme Court struck down another door-to-door regulation in Village
J.L. & TECH. 27, *43 (2004) (concluding that "[t]he Supreme Court has, however, endorsed rules analogous to
the do-not-call list for protecting privacy" in Martin and Village of Schaumberg). See also Nadel, supra note
14, at 104-05 (concluding that "courts have been more receptive to restrictions on point-to-point media,
including phone and mail communications, because such restrictions need not prevent dissemination of
messages to willing recipients").
156. Id. at 141, 142, 150.
157. Id. at 141-42.
158. Id. at 141, 146-49. For the Martin Court, Justice Black wrote: "Whether such visiting shall be
permitted has in general been deemed to depend upon the will of the individual master of each household, and
not upon the determination of the community. In the instant case, the [city] has attempted to make this
decision for all its inhabitants." Id. at 141.
159. Id. at 146-147. Justice Black went on: "The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by
traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers
as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked
restriction of the dissemination of ideas." Martin, 319 U.S. at 146-47.
160. Id. at 148-49.
161. Id. at 148 ("A city can punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will
of the occupant [not to be disturbed] .... "); see also Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y v. Village of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 165-69 (2002) (ruling that a city ordinance requiring permits for door-to-door "canvessers" was
unconstitutional while noting, inter alia, that provisions in the ordinance allowing residents to post "No
Solicitation" signs to bar solicitors from their property helped provide "ample protection for unwilling
listeners"); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980) (ruling
unconstitutional a city ordinance banning "door-to-door" or "on-street" solicitation for charitable donations,
unless seventy-five percent or more of the receipts were actually being used for charitable purposes and
noting, among other things, that an ordinance allowing citizens to block solicitors from their residences with a
"No Solicitors or Peddlers Invited" sign "suggest[ed] the availability of less intrusive and more effective
measures to protect privacy").
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of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment.162  In that case, a village
ordinance prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting door-to-door unless
seventy-five percent or more of the donations they collected were used for charitable
purposes. 163  In the case, the village argued that the ordinance served to protect the
public from fraud, invasions of privacy and public safety threats. 164 The Court agreed
with the village that these were legitimate governmental interests but nonetheless found
the ordinance unconstitutionally broad. 165 As an alternative, the Court suggested, the
village could directly regulate and penalize specific instances of fraudulent
misrepresentation or could require charitable organizations to affirmatively disclose the
percentage of donations used for charitable purposes. 
166
In addition, the Village of Schaumburg Court concluded that the village had not
established a sufficient relationship between the ordinance and the asserted
governmental interests in protecting privacy and promoting public safety. 167  For
instance, there was no evidence that charitable organizations that satisfied the seventy-
five percent requirement were less of a threat to privacy or public safety than those that
did not meet the threshold. 168  Writing for the majority, Justice White stated,
"householders are equally disturbed by solicitation on behalf of organizations satisfying
the [seventy-five percent] requirement as they are by solicitation on behalf of other
organizations." 
169
Both Martin and Village of Schaumburg involved door-to-door communication of
162. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
163. Id. at 622 n.4. The ordinance stated that in order to solicit lawfully, a charitable organization must
have had "a certified audit of the last full year of operations, indicating the distribution of funds collected by
the organization, or such other comparable evidence as may demonstrate the fact that at least seventy-five per
cent of the funds collected are utilized directly and solely for the charitable purpose of the organization." Id.
at n.4 (quoting SCHAUMBURG, OH., CODE ch. 22, art. III, § 22-20 (1974)).
164. Id. at 636.
165. Id. at 637 (concluding there were "measures less intrusive than a direct prohibition on solicitation"
available). The Supreme Court also struck down similar restrictions on fundraising in two subsequent cases.
In Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., the Court ruled unconstitutional a Maryland
law that prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting if they used more than twenty-five percent of their
collections for expenses unless they could obtain a waiver from the state based on a showing of financial
necessity. 467 U.S. 947, 962 (1984). In Riley v. Nat'l Fed. of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., the Court
likewise ruled unconstitutional a North Carolina law that limited professional fundraisers to collecting
reasonable and non-excessive fees as determined by the state. 487 U.S. 781, 784-86 (1988). For discussion
of Village of Schaumburg, Munson and Riley in the context of percentage-based restrictions on charitable
solicitations, see Meacham, supra note 34, at 67-69. In 2003, the Supreme Court characterized the
challenged regulations in Village of Schaumburg, Munson and Riley as unconstitutional prophylactic
measures. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 610 (2003).
166. Village of Schamburg, 444 U.S. at 637-38. For instance, in 2003, the Court reversed an order of the
Illinois Supreme Court dismissing a fraud action by the Attorney General of Illinois against a for-profit
fundraising company hired to solicit funds for a non-profit veterans organization. Telemarketing Associates,
538 U.S. at 606. The state had alleged that the fundraising company defrauded the public by claiming falsely
that a "significant amount" of the donations would be used for charitable purposes when in actuality only
fifteen percent of collected donations went to the charitable organization and eighty-five percent was retained
by the fundraising company. Id. at 605. The Court held that states can constitutionally "maintain fraud
actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their
donations will be used." Id. at 624. The Telemarketing Associates Court distinguished state fraud actions
against individual solicitors from the type of "prophylactic" approach at issue in the Village of Schaumburg
case. Id. at 610, 612-13.
167. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 638.
168. Id. at 638-39.
169. Id. at 638.
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noncommercial messages. 170  In Rowan v. United States Post Office, decided in
1970,171 the Supreme Court addressed the rights of postal customers to prevent
unwanted commercial solicitations delivered by direct mail. In Rowan, the Court
upheld a federal statute that allowed a postal customer to object to a direct mail
advertisement that he or she considered "'erotically arousing or sexually provocative"'
and block future mailings from that particular sender. 172
In deciding the case, the Rowan Court balanced the First Amendment rights of
commercial speakers and the targeted recipients of their messages. 173 Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger stated: "Weighing the highly important right to
communicate ... against the very basic right to be free from sights, sounds, and
tangible matter we do not want, it seems to us that a mailer's right to communicate must
stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee." 
174
On this point, two factors seemed especially important to the Rowan Court in
reaching its decision. First, the regulation gave postal customers complete autonomy to
decide which mailings that they objected to and wished not to receive again. 175 Thus,
the Court concluded that the regulation in Rowan was distinguishable from the seventy-
five percent requirement found unconstitutional in Village of Schaumburg, which did
not similarly facilitate consumer choice to receive or not receive communications. 1
76
170. Noncommercial solicitation is likely entitled to a higher level of First Amendment protection than
commercial solicitation. See Strauss, supra note 155, at 37-38 (discussing the varied levels of First
Amendment protection for noncommercial solicitations and commercial speech). However, as pointed out in
a recent law review comment, the First Amendment does not insulate false and misleading representations by
telemarketers seeking charitable contributions from legal actions such as fraud. See Meacham, supra note 34,
at 69 (discussing Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 610 (2003)).
171. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
172. Id. at 729-30, 738-39 (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (1964)). Under the statute, once the Postmaster
General receives notice from a postal customer that the customer has received a commercial mailing that the
customer finds "in his sole discretion ... to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative" and does not wish
to receive, the Postmaster General is authorized to issue an order to the sender to delete that customer's name
and address from all of the sender's mailing lists. Id. at 729-30 (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) (1964)).
173. Id. at 736. In addition, Chief Justice Burger wrote that "Congress has erected a wall-or more
accurately permits a citizen to erect a wall-that no advertiser may penetrate without his acquiescence." Id. at
738.
174. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736-37. For the majority, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
To hold less would tend to license a form of trespass and would make hardly more sense than to
say that a radio or television viewer may not twist the dial to cut off an offensive or boring
communication and thus bar its entering his home. Nothing in the Constitution compels us to
listen to or view any unwanted communication, whatever its merit; we see no basis for according
the printed word or pictures a different or more preferred status because they are sent by mail.
Id. at 737.
175. Id. at 737. For the Court, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
Both the absoluteness of the citizen's right... and its finality are essential; what may not be
provocative to one person may well be to another. In operative effect the power of the
householder under the statute is unlimited; he may prohibit the mailing of a dry goods catalog
because he objects to the contents-or indeed the text of the language touting the merchandise.
Congress provided this sweeping power not only to protect privacy but to avoid possible
constitutional questions that might arise from vesting the power to make any discretionary
evaluation of the material in a government official.
Id.
176. See Nadel, supra note 14, at 112 (suggesting in 1986 that this approach would offer the "best
solutions to the telemarketing problem" and "would thus allow individuals to select the types of calls they
receive, rather than presenting them with an all-or-nothing choice" and noting that the statute at issue in
Rowan "avoids the First Amendment problem because all discretion is left with the individual and not
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Secondly, it was critical to the ruling that the postal regulation in Rowan was not a
categorical ban on all direct mail solicitations. 177 Direct mail marketers remained free
to send solicitations to postal customers who had not yet filed a specific objection to
their mailings. Thus, unlike the solicitation ban at issue in Martin, the postal regulation.. .. • - . 178
in Rowan allowed marketers to communicate with non-objecting recipients.
Of course, Rowan was decided before the Supreme Court decided Virginia Board
of Pharmacy in 1976 and Central Hudson in 1980. Thus, when Rowan was decided,
pure commercial speech was not yet incorporated into the First Amendment, and the
Central Hudson analysis had yet to be established. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corporation, a direct mail case decided in 1983, the Supreme Court used the Central
Hudson analysis to strike down a federal statute banning unsolicited direct mail
, , . 179
advertising for contraceptives.
The Bolger Court concluded first that the federal statue prohibited constitutionally-
protected commercial speech-truthful and non-deceptive advertising for
contraceptives-and, thus, implicated the remaining Central Hudson factors. 180 Under
the second factor, the Bolger Court found the government's asserted interest in "aiding
parents' efforts to discuss birth control with their children" was sufficiently
substantial. 18 1  However, the Court found the federal ban on unsolicited direct mail
contraceptive advertising failed the last two factors and was unconstitutional.
Under the direct-advancement requirement of the third factor, the Court found the
ban was largely ineffective in serving the asserted regulatory goal. 182  The Court
suggested that, at best, the ban assisted the presumably small percentage of parents
whose children had uncontrolled access to the household mail and were not exposed to
contraceptive information from other sources. 183  Under the narrow-tailoring
requirement of the fourth factor, the Court found the ban too broad and unconstitutional
on that ground as well. 184 Summarizing, the Bolger Court concluded that the "marginal
degree of protection" provided by the ban came at too high of a constitutional cost.
1 85
As Justice Marshall explained, the ban operated "by purging all mailboxes of
reviewable by any government officials").
177. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737 ( "In this case the mailer's right to communicate is circumscribed only by an
affirmative act of the addressee giving notice that he wishes no further mailings from that mailer.").
178. See Strauss, supra note 155, at 43 (writing about Martin and Rowan and summarizing that "[w]hile
the Court has consistently struck down attempts by municipalities to preemptively stop solicitors from
knocking on doors by requiring them to obtain licenses or notify the police in advance, it has recognized and
sanctioned provisions giving individuals the ability to prevent intrusive solicitations").




183. Id. For the majority, Justice Marshall wrote, "a ban on unsolicited [contraceptive] advertisements
serves only to assist those parents who desire to keep their children from confronting such mailings, who are
otherwise unable to do so, and whose children have remained relatively free from such stimuli." Id. To the
contrary, the Court assumed that "parents already exercise substantial control over the disposition of mail
once it enters their mailboxes." Bolger, 463 U.S. at 73. In addition, the Court noted that children are likely to
be exposed to contraceptive advertising carried in mass media vehicles and drug store displays. Id. at 73 n.26.
Similarly, the Court noted that many minors receive sexual education that includes exposure to the topic of
contraception. Id.
184. See id. at 73-75.
185. Id. at 73-74.
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unsolicited material that is entirely suitable for adults." 1
86
The Bolger Court explicitly distinguished the previous ruling in Rowan.
187
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall explained that in Rowan, the Court
"recognized the important interest in allowing addressees to give notice to a mailer that
they wish no further mailings which, in their sole discretion, they believe to be
[objectionable.]"' 188  However, the statute in Bolger provided no such option and
instead operated as a categorical ban as to willing and unwilling recipients alike. 189
Justice Marshall wrote: "[W]e have never held that the government itself can shut off
the flow of mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially be offended." 1
90
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided another First Amendment challenge to a
regulation on commercial direct mail solicitation. In Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 191 a 5-4 majority of the Court upheld a state regulation prohibiting lawyers from
sending targeted, direct mail solicitations to accident victims within thirty days after
their accidents. 192  In previous cases, the Court had ruled that states could not
constitutionally ban lawyers from advertising prices for routine legal services 193 or
completely ban lawyers from sending targeted, direct mail solicitations to prospective
clients. 194 However, the Court had not addressed the constitutionality of a time-limited
restriction on targeted, direct mail solicitations by lawyers.
In Went For It, the thirty day ban clearly restricted protected commercial speech-
truthful and non-misleading solicitations offering lawful services-and thus triggered
the remaining factors of the Central Hudson analysis. 195 Under the second factor, the
Court found the state had substantial government interests in protecting accident victim
privacy and preserving the reputation of the legal profession. 196  Thus, the decision
turned on the application of the direct-advancement and the narrow-tailoring
requirements of the third and fourth Central Hudson factors.
Under the third Central Hudson factor, the Court found that the thirty day ban
sufficiently advanced the asserted government interests. 19 7 The state had submitted a
summary of anecdotal and statistical evidence to support arguments that the public
considered direct mail solicitation of accident victims to be an invasion of privacy and a
186. Id. For the majority, Justice Marshall wrote: "We have previously made clear that a restriction of
this scope is more extensive than the Constitution permits, for the government may not 'reduce the adult
population . . . to reading only what is fit for children."' Bolger, 463 U.S. at 73-74 (quoting Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).




191. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
192. Id. at 620. For discussion of the Went For It decision and its impact on state regulation of direct mail
soliciting by lawyers, see generally, John Phillips, Note, Six Years after Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: The
Continual Erosion of First Amendment Rights, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197 (2000).
193. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
194. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
195. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 623-24.
196. Id. at 624-25. For the majority, Justice O'Connor wrote: "[Tihe purpose of the ... ban is to forestall
the outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal profession that the practice of direct solicitation only
days after accidents has engendered." Id. at 631.
197. Id. at 625-34.
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• 198poor reflection on the legal profession. The 5-4 majority found this summary to be
sufficient evidence on which to conclude that curbing direct mail solicitations to
accident victims would sufficiently serve to protect accident victim privacy and
alleviate negative public perceptions of the legal profession. 1
99
Under the final Central Hudson factor, the majority concluded that the thirty-day
ban was sufficiently narrow in scope because it left open other means for lawyers to
communicate with prospective clients. 200  Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
stated that lawyers had "ample alternative channels" to communicate with accident
victims during the thirty-day ban, including mass media advertising and telephone
directory listings. 201 In addition, lawyers were not prohibited from sending targeted
direct mail solicitations to accident victims beyond thirty days after their accidents.
The door-to-door and direct mail solicitation cases discussed above provide
constitutional lessons for regulation of other point-to-point solicitation activities such as
telemarketing. First, solicitation regulations that allow for alternate means of
communication between commercial speakers and their targets stand a better chance of
surviving constitutional challenge. Secondly, regulations that effectively and narrowly
serve the right of consumers to reject unwanted solicitations likewise seem better
equipped to withstand constitutional challenge. Third, regulations that focus on the
mode of communication as opposed to the message itself also seem more likely to
withstand challenge. 202
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL BAN ON UNSOLICITED TELEFAX
ADVERTISING
The federal ban on unsolicited telefax advertising had been challenged in the courts
on First Amendment grounds prior to creation of the do-not-call registry requirements.
At issue in these cases were provisions in the TCPA rendering it unlawful "to send an
unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine." 20 3  The TCPA defines
198. Id. at 626-28 (describing the "106-page summary" of the Florida Bar's "2-year study of lawyer
advertising and solicitation"). Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor described the summary as reflecting
"statistical and anecdotal" support for the proposition that "the Florida public views direct mail solicitations in
the immediate wake of accidents as an intrusion on privacy that reflects poorly upon the profession." Id. at
626.
199. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 631-32. Although the majority found the summary sufficient to establish
direct and material advancement under the Central Hudson analysis, the four dissenters strongly disagreed
and found the summary mostly anecdotal and inadequate. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 640-41 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). On this point, Justice O'Connor, writing preemptively in the majority opinion, concluded that
empirical data need not "come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background information" in speech
regulation cases. Id. at 628. Justice O'Connor wrote, "[W]e believe the evidence adduced by the [Florida]
Bar is sufficient to meet the standard elaborated in Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993)." Id. She pointed
out that the Court had allowed litigants in previous speech regulation cases to rely upon "reference to studies
and anecdotes." Id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986); Barnes v. Glen
Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584-85 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)).
200. Id. at 633-34.
201. WentForIt, 515 U.S. at 633-34.
202. One commentator has described this as focusing on the "non-communicative" aspects of commercial
speech as opposed to the "communicative" aspects. Sweet, supra note 155, at 940-54. He analogized
regulations of non-communicative aspects of commercial speech to content-neutral "time, place and manner
regulations of noncommercial speech." Id. at 948.
203. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2004).
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"unsolicited advertisement" as "any material advertising the commercial availability or
quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without
that person's prior express invitation or permission." 20 4  The only two federal circuit
courts of appeals to address the constitutionality of the telefax advertising ban upheld
the provisions. The cases are relevant to constitutional issues surrounding the do-not-
call registry because of the disparate treatment of unsolicited telefaxes deemed
commercial and noncommercial, and the exemptions for some forms of unsolicited
telefax advertising.
In Destinations Ventures, LTD. v. FCC, decided in 1995, the United States Court of
Appeals, Ninth Circuit, upheld the restrictions on unsolicited telefax advertising.
20 5
Destination Ventures, a travel company that wanted to send unsolicited telefax
advertising to travel agents,2 06 filed suit in Oregon federal district court challenging the
provisions on First Amendment grounds. 207  On motion filed by the FCC, the trial
judge dismissed the case and also denied a motion for summary judgment filed by
Destination Ventures.
20 8
On appeal, the U.S. Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district judge. 209 The Ninth
Circuit conducted a de novo review of the constitutional issues and applied the Central
210Hudson analysis to the restrictions on telefax advertising. The parties already had
agreed in the district court proceedings that the ban applied to protected commercial
speech and needed to survive the Central Hudson analysis. 2 11 In addition, Destination
Ventures agreed with the FCC on appeal that the government had a substantial interest
204. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (2004).
205. 46 F.3d 54, 55 (9th Cir. 1995). The specific provision at issue banned using a telefax machine to
deliver an "unsolicted advertisement" defined in the statute as "any material advertising the commercial
availability or quality of any property, goods or services which is transmitted to any person without that
person's prior express invitation or permission." Id. at 55 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (1992)).
206. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55.
207. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 844 F. Supp. 632 (D. Oregon 1994). Destination Ventures was
joined in the suit by other businesses as plaintiffs; the challenged provisions made it unlawful to "use any
telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other devise to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone
facsimile machine." Id. at 634 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (1991)). The statute defined an "unsolicited
advertisement" as "any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods or
services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission." Id.
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (1991)).
208. Id. at 632. In addition, the trial judge refused to grant the summary judgment motion filed by
Destination Ventures. Id. at 640. In the opinion, the trial judge applied the Central Hudson analysis and
found that the government had a sufficiently substantial interest in protecting consumers from the costs of
receiving unwanted commercial telefaxes, that the ban directly advanced that interest, and that the ban was
narrowly tailored. Id. at 637-39. In doing, the district judge rejected arguments by Destination Ventures that
the FCC had failed to prove the degree to which cost-shifting connected with unsolicited telefax advertising
was an actual problem for consumers. Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 637. However, on this point, the
judge simply concluded it was sufficient that Congress had identified such cost-shifting as a regulatory target
and had addressed it with a ban on unsolicited telefax advertising. Id. In addition, the judge concluded that
the ban was narrowly tailored because it banned only the type of unsolicited telefaxes associated with the
cost-shifting with which Congress was concerned-advertisements. Id. at 638-39. The trial judge
distinguished the Discovery Network case in which the Supreme Court had struck down a city ban on
commercial newsracks. Id. at 639. The trial judge pointed out that in Discovery Network, the city wanted to
"alleviate street clutter" but had only banned commercial newsracks when noncommercial newsracks were by
far the most prevalent type of newsracks on city streets. Id.
209. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55.
210. Id. at 55-57.
211. Destination Ventures, 211 F. Supp. at 635.
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in preventing marketers from shifting costs of telefax advertising to businesses and
consumers without their consent.
212
However, Destination Ventures argued on appeal that the ban failed to directly
advance this regulatory goal under the third Central Hudson factor. Specifically,
Destination Ventures argued that prohibited telefax advertisements would be no more
costly to receive than the types of telefaxes that were permitted. 2 13 The Ninth Circuit,
however, pointed out that Destination Ventures admitted that "unsolicited commercial
fax solicitations are responsible for the bulk of advertising cost shifting" and that
"banning them is a reasonable means to achieve Congress's goal of reducing cost
shifting." 214 On those grounds, the appellate court concluded that the restrictions
served the regulatory goal directly enough under the Central Hudson analysis.
In addition to finding direct advancement, the appellate court concluded the ban
was sufficiently narrow under the fourth Central Hudson factor. 2 15  Destination
Ventures had argued the ban was excessive in light of technological developments that
had reduced the costs of receiving telefax transmissions since Congress had enacted the
TCPA in 1991. 2 16  However, the appellate court rejected this argument and instead
focused on "the problem as it existed when Congress enacted the [restrictions].
' 217
After the Ninth Circuit's decision in Destination Ventures, the same telefax
advertising restrictions were upheld by federal district courts in Indiana in 1995 218 and
Texas in 2000. 219However, deviating from this trend, a Missouri federal district court
found the restrictions unconstitutional in 2002 in Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. American
Blast Fax, Inc. 220 In that case, the Missouri Attorney General-later joined by the
FCC-sued two telefax marketers in federal district court for allegedly violating the
federal ban on unsolicited telefax advertising. 22 1 The telefax marketers challenged the
ban on First Amendment grounds.
222
Under the first Central Hudson factor, the district judge concluded that the ban on
unsolicited telefax advertising impacted protected commercial speech and needed to be
212. Id. at 56. The trial court below had concluded that in passing the ban, Congress had a sufficiently
substantial government interest in "protecting consumers from ... economic harm" by preventing advertisers
from shifting the costs of telefax advertising to recipients including direct costs associated with operating a
telefax machine such as the cost of paper and ink, and indirect costs associated with having one's telefax
machine occupied while receiving unsolicited telefax advertising and unavailable to receive other telefaxes.
Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 635-37.
213. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56.
214. Id. at 56. The appeals court characterized the ban as "evenhanded" because "it applies to commercial
solicitation by any organization, be it a multinational corporation or the Girl Scouts." Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. For instance, Destination Ventures argued, newer telefax machines allowed for paperless receipt
of transmissions and simultaneous receipt of multiple telefaxes. Id.
217. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57.
218. Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 912 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
219. Texas v. American Blastfax, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
220. 196 F. Supp. 2d 920 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
221. Id. at 922. In addition, Missouri alleged that American Blast Fax violated Missouri laws against
deceptive marketing by representing to Missouri consumers that its telefax advertising was in compliance
with federal law. Id. at 921. American Blast Fax filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit and claimed that the
telefax ban was unconstitutional. Id. at 922. The FCC intervened in the suit to defend the constitutionality of
the telefax advertising ban. Id. at 922-23.
222. Id at 922. The FCC intervened in the suit to defend the constitutionality of the telefax advertising
ban. American Blast Fax, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 921-22.
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tested under the remaining three factors. 223 However, at that point the court departed
from the path taken by each federal court that had considered the matter previously. In
this case, the judge concluded that the restrictions failed to pass muster under each of
the three remaining Central Hudson factors.
224
Under the second Central Hudson factor, the district judge reviewed the legislative
history of the TCPA and refused to conclude that cost-shifting related to unsolicited
telefax advertising was a "real and substantial" problem in need of regulation when
Congress passed the TCPA. 225  The judge conceded that the "potential" for cost-
shifting problems existed at that time but found this too speculative and inadequate to
conclude that Congress thereby had a sufficiently substantial governmental interest
under the second Central Hudson factor.
226
Under the third factor requiring direct advancement, the district judge found
insufficient evidence to justify a ban on unsolicited telefax advertising but not other
unsolicited telefaxes. 22 7  Specifically, with no evidence that unsolicited telefax
advertisements were more costly and burdensome than other types of unsolicited
telefaxes, the judge concluded that banning the former, and not the latter, was
constitutionally unsound.228 In addition, the judge suggested that there were alternate
regulatory means available-such as a national "do not fax" database-that would more
directly address the asserted regulatory goal without a categorical ban. 229  Thus, he
concluded, the restrictions also failed the narrow-tailoring requirement of the Central
Hudson analysis.
2 30
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reversed the district
judge in American Blast Fax.23 1 The appeals court agreed with the district judge that
223. Id.
224. Id. at 928-34. The district court concluded: "The government simply fails to meet its burden of
demonstrating that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree .... The government also fails to show that the regulations are no more extensive than is necessary to
serve the government's interests." Id. at 933-34.
225. Id. at 928-31. In addition, the district court concluded that there was insufficient empirical evidence
in the legislative history to establish the extent to which consumers and businesses were prevented from
receiving telefaxes because their machines were occupied while receiving unsolicited telefax advertisements.
Id. at 929.
226. American Blast Fax, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 931. The district judge wrote: "The Court finds that there is
a potential for a serious problem to arise without legislative restrictions on unsolicited faxes. However, the
Court questions whether the government has met its burden in showing that there was a substantial interest at
the time of enacting the TCPA." Id. The court was much less ambivalent in finding that the restrictions failed
to pass scrutiny under the final two factors of the Central Hudson analysis. Id. at 931-32. The district judge
wrote, "Even if the government could meet its burden of showing a substantial interest, it cannot satisfy the
other parts of the Central Hudson test." Id. at 931.
227. Id. at 931-32. For instance, the district court wrote, "There is no evidence as to the number of
unsolicited faxes the average business receives, and there is no breakdown as to how many of those are
advertisements which fall within the TCPA's definition." Id. at 932.
228. American Blast Fax, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 931. The district judge wrote: "The TCPA does not ban all
unsolicited faxes, but rather only advertisements. Therefore, recipients can still bear the costs of printing
others' messages, even if they strongly oppose the messages' content. The costs of printing political
messages, jokes, and even some advertisements which are not included within the TCPA's definition, still fall
upon the recipient." Id.
229. Id. at 932-33.
230. Id.
231. Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 652 (8th Cir. 2004). In doing so,
the appeals court specifically noted that the district judge below had deviated from every federal court
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the telefax advertising ban needed to be fully scrutinized under the Central Hudson
analysis. 232  In other words, the application of the analysis was not disputed by the
parties or questioned by the court of appeals.
Under the second Central Hudson factor, the Eighth Circuit found that Missouri
and the FCC established a sufficiently "substantial [governmental] interest in restricting
unsolicited fax advertisements in order to prevent cost shifting and interference such
unwanted advertising places on the recipient." 233 The court of appeals concluded that
empirical studies and quantitative evidence were unnecessary to establish the
significance of these harms under the Central Hudson analysis. 234 The court concluded
that anecdotal evidence cited in the legislative history of the TCPA and the record of the
proceedings before the district court were sufficient under this requirement.
235
Under the third Central Hudson factor, the Eighth Circuit found that the telefax
advertising restrictions also satisfied the direct-advancement requirement. 2 3 6 In doing
so, the appeals court rejected the telemarketers' argument that the ban was
constitutionally problematic because it applied to unsolicited telefax advertising but not
other unsolicited telefaxes. 2 3 7  The telemarketers argued on appeal that the goals of
preventing unwanted cost-shifting and interference with telefax machines did not justify
the regulatory distinction between commercial and noncommercial content in
telefaxes. 23 8  On this point, they cited to Discovery Network, the case in which the
Supreme Court had struck down a newsrack ordinance that banned commercial but not
noncommercial newsracks. 2 3 9  However, the court of appeals distinguished the
Discovery Network case. The newsrack ordinance in that case allowed noncommercial
newsracks to clutter the sidewalks in large number while banning relatively few
commercial newsracks, which did little to advance sidewalk safety or aesthetics, the
appeals court explained. 24  On the other hand, the court noted, the TCPA focused on
decision that had addressed the constitutionality of the same provisions. Id. at 653 (citing Destination
Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'g 844 F. Supp. 632 (D. Or. 1994); Texas v. American Blast Fax,
Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1092 (W.D. Tex. 2000); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1169
(S.D. Ind. 1997)).
232. American Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 653. The appeals court pointed out that the parties were in
agreement that "fax advertisements ... are commercial speech, and the Supreme Court has recently indicated
that Central Hudson remains the test for the constitutionality of a restriction on commercial speech." Id. The
appeals court also noted that the government did not raise any argument that the fax advertisements in
question were unprotected by the First Amendment as either "misleading" or concerning "unlawful activity."
Id.
233. Id. at 655.
234. Id. at 654-55.
235. American Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 654-55. The Eighth Circuit concluded that "the legislative record
and the evidence produced in the district court adequately demonstrate the potential harm of unrestrained fax
advertising" and stated "we do not [find] ... that the Government must produce empirical studies to show the
significance of the harm it seeks to remedy." Id. at 654 (citing Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
628 (1995)).
236. Id. at 655-58. For instance, the appeals court pointed out, the TCPA banned unsolicited telefax
advertising but allowed unsolicited telefaxes with noncommercial messages and that the FCC had allowed
businesses to send unsolicited telefax advertising to consumers with whom they have an "existing business
relationship." Id.
237. Id. at 655-56.
238. Id. at 655.
239. Id.
240. American Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 655-56. The appeals court concluded that the telefax advertising
ban was different than the ban on commercial newracks in Discovery Network because in that case, the
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unsolicited commercial telefaxes, which was the type that Congress determined to be
the most prevalent and problematic for businesses and consumers.241
The telemarketers also argued that the TCPA and related FCC regulations
comprised an irrational regulatory scheme because they allowed unsolicited telefax
advertising to recipients with whom the sender had an "established business
relationship" and various types of live telemarketing calls, in addition to allowing
242unsolicited noncommercial telefaxes. . Relying on Coors Brewing and Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting, the telemarketers argued that these contradictory provisions
rendered the TCPA ineffective in accomplishing the asserted governmental interest in.. 243
banning unsolicited commercial telefax solicitations. The appeals court rejected this
argument as well.
Instead, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Congress was reasonable in assuming
that unsolicited commercial telefax advertising sent by companies to non-customers was
more likely to be objectionable than that transmitted to existing customers. 244  The
appeals court also concluded that TCPA provisions allowing live telemarketing calls
were consistent with the goal of preventing telemarketers from shifting actual costs of
receiving solicitations to consumers. 24 5  For instance, the appeals court noted, the
TCPA prohibited live telemarketing calls to devices such as cellular telephones and
pagers that result in costs to recipients. 246  Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded, the
TCPA-as an overall regulatory scheme-was not so "pierced by exemptions and
inconsistencies" to be found unconstitutional like the one struck down by the Supreme
Court in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting247 nor as "overall irrational" as the one the
Court ruled unconstitutional in Coors Brewing.
248
Finally, the Eighth Circuit found the telefax advertising ban narrowly tailored
under the fourth Central Hudson factor.249 The court of appeals did not characterize
the restrictions as a full ban 25  noting that FCC rules allowed unsolicited telefax
advertising sent by a company to individuals and entities with whom the sender has an• . . ,251
"established business relationship," and to anyone who consented to receiving the
evidence demonstrated that commercial newsracks comprised only a small percentage of the total number of
newsracks on the city's streets and sidewalks. Id. at n.4 When enacting the telefax advertising ban, on the
other hand, the appeals court found that Congress had concluded that "commercial faxes make up a large
proportion of all unsolicited faxes." Id.
241. Id. at 654-58.
242. Id. at 657.
243. American Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 656-57.
244. Id. at 657. The appeals court wrote, "It would not have been unreasonable for Congress to conclude
that a preexisting business relationship is an indication that a fax advertisement would be welcome." Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. The appeals court concluded that TCPA provisions allowing certain live telemarketing calls were
consistent with the government's asserted goal of preventing cost-shifting in that, for instance, the TCPA
included provisions prohibiting live telemarketing calls to devices such as cellular telephones that involved
direct costs to consumers receiving those calls. American Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 657 (citing 47 U.S.C. §
227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).
247. Id. at 657 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 190
(1999)).
248. Id. (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company, Inc., 514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995)),
249. Id. at 658-59.
250. Id. at 659, 660.
251. Id. at 657 (noting that the FCC had "interpreted TCPA not to prohibit the sending of unsolicited
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advertising. 252  In addition, the court suggested, marketers remained free to reach
consumers through other means such as direct mail marketing and mass media
advertising. 253 The appeals court characterized the restrictions on unsolicited telefax
advertising as a reasonable means of protecting consumers from the costs of unwanted
commercial telefax solicitations.
254
The appeals court likened the restriction on unsolicited telefax advertising to the
thirty-day ban on direct mail solicitations by lawyers to accident victims, upheld by the
Supreme Court in Went For It. 255 That restriction, the appeals court noted, only applied
to targeted, direct mail solicitations, the mode of communication the state considered
most threatening to individual privacy and the reputation of the legal profession.
Lawyers still could use other modes of communication to reach potential clients,
including mass media advertising. 256  Therefore, the telefax advertising ban was
different than the restrictions on mass media advertising the Supreme Court struck
down in cases such as Coors Brewing.257 On this point, the appeals court wrote:
commercial faxes to a recipient with whom a sender has an established business relationship") (citing In the
Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R.
8752, 8779 n.87 (Oct. 16, 1992)).
252. American Blast Fax, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 659, 660. The appeals court concluded that the "TCPA has
not eliminated the fax machine as an available channel of communication." Id. at 660. However, since the
Eighth Circuit ruled on the case, the FCC amended its rules and eliminated the exemption for telefax
advertising sent to individuals or companies with whom the sender has an "established business relationship"
effective July 1, 2005. See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,148-49 (July 25, 2003) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 64:68); Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 69 Fed. Reg. 62,816 (Oct. 28,
2004) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64). In addition, in the amendments, the FCC required that consent to
receive a telefax advertisement must be express and written. Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 68 FedReg. 44,144, 44,148-49 (July 25, 2005) (to be codified
at 41 C.F.R. pt. 64:68).
In 2005, the FCC delayed the effective date of the written permission requirement to January 9, 2006.
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,705,
37,705 (June 30, 2005). Subsequently, Congress enacted the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, amending the
unsolicited facsimile advertising provisions in the TCPA of 1991 and requiring the FCC to conduct a
rulemaking proceeding accordingly. Pub L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (2005) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227;
signed into law on July 9, 2005). The FCC subsequently suspended the effective date of the written
permission requirement until completing its rulemaking proceeding. Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 70 Fed. Reg. 75,070, 75,070 (Dec. 19, 2005). The FCC then
initiated its rulemaking proceeding, which remained pending at the time of this article. In the Matter of Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Junk Fax Prevention Act of
2005, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order, CG Docket No. 05-338, 2005 W.L. 3369907, at *1 (F.C.C.)
(Dec. 9, 2005).
253. American Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 660 (concluding that "advertisers remain free to publicize their
products through many legal means other than an unsolicited fax.").
254. Id. at 659 (relying on Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 632). The appeals court conceded that the ban on
unsolicited telefax advertisements would likely prevent some consumers from receiving telefax advertising
they might wish to receive. Id. However, the appeals court concluded that the ban was reasonable
nonetheless to prevent other consumers from incurring the costs of receiving unwanted telefax
advertisements. Id.
255. Id. at 659-60.
256. Id. at 660. The appeals court did not address the extent to which alternatives such as mass media
advertising would be as effective or cost-efficient in reaching accident victims as individually targeted, direct
mail solicitations. One commentator wrote that while "[s]ome companies may invest more in direct mail,
traditional media advertising, and Intemet-based marketing, these alternatives do not provide marketers with
what they really want-namely a direct line to the consumer's living room." Douglas C. Nelson, The Do-Not-
Call Implementation Act: Legislating the Sound of Silence, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 63, 83 (2003).
257. American Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 659-660.
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[T]he TCPA ban on unsolicited commercial fax advertisements is neither intended to
protect the public from the content of the speech nor to implement policy unrelated to
the delivery of the message itself. In prohibiting these fax advertisements, Congress
was not concerned with the effect of the content of the advertisements, but rather the
effect of the act of communicating .... The harm associated with unsolicited fax
advertisements is similarly not related to the content of the messages. 258
In 2004, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in American Blast Fax and allowed
the Eighth Circuit decision to stand. 259 In addition, the FCC amended its telemarketing
rules to prohibit sending unsolicited advertising to a telefax machine without prior
written permission from the recipient, although the FCC had delayed the effective date
of this requirement at the time of this article.
260
In the context of unsolicited telefax advertising, protecting recipients from
unwanted tangible costs connected with receiving telefax communications seemed
central to the decisions of the courts of appeals. Although telemarketing calls do not
result in similar tangible costs, commentators have pointed to intangible costs to
consumers connected with unwanted telemarketing calls, including disturbance of
privacy and annoyance. 261 However, whether tangible or intangible, the question for
regulators becomes the extent to which message costs are being imposed on unwilling
recipients and the constitutional limits of regulatory efforts utilized to curb such shifting
of message-related costs. 
262
V. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE NATIONAL Do-NOT-CALL REGISTRY
Telemarketers challenged the do-not-call registry requirements in federal courts
before the registry became effective. One action challenging the jurisdiction of the FTC
to establish and maintain the registry did not reach First Amendment issues. However,
258. Id.
259. Fax.com, Inc. v. Missouri ex rel. Nixon, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004). In a prior case, a federal court of
appeals had upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute that bans the use of automatic dialing devices to
deliver prerecorded messages unless the recorded message is introduced by a live speaker. Moser v. Fed.
Commc'n Comm'n, 46 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1995). The appeals court only addressed the constitutionality
of the statutory provisions and specifically noted that an FCC regulation exempting automated calls on behalf
of tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations was not at issue in the case. Id. at 972-73, 974. The Supreme Court
declined to review the decision of the federal appeals court. Moser v. F.C.C., 515 U.S. 1161 (1995).
260. See supra note 252.
261. Commentators have argued that telemarketing calls to individuals involve intangible costs, such as
annoyance and disturbance associated with receiving an unwanted telemarketing call, that telemarketers shift
to consumers and do not themselves bear. Ayres and Funk, supra note 66, at 78, 83-85. They describe the
consumer costs of direct marketing as generally "hard to quantify" but, in the specific context of
telemarketing, related to the physical efforts involved with answering the telephone and the time spent talking
in response to an unwanted telemarketing call. Id. at 83-84. They suggest that the increase of unwanted
telemarketing calls results in a convergence of lowering response rates, development and sales of products
and services to screen out telemarketers, and government regulation, all of which they describe as a "looming
crisis for the direct marketing industry." Id. at 88.
262. Id. at 85 (writing that "[b]ecause direct marketers do not internalize the full costs of their behavior,
they solicit an excessively broad audience" and "are less discriminating [in who they contact] than they
should be"). See also Cain, supra note 66, at 665 (concluding that "[because] the consumer pays for the very
phone line that telemarketers now freely use for their profit-motivated speech, such [regulatory] restrictions,
in response to consumer demands, are completely appropriate").
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in another case, the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, ultimately upheld the
registry under the Central Hudson analysis, and the Supreme Court allowed that
decision to stand.
In U.S. Security v. FTC, a group of telemarketers, along with the Direct Marketing
Association, filed suit in Oklahoma federal district court challenging the jurisdiction of
the FTC to establish and enforce the national do-not-call registry. 26 3 In 2003, District
Judge Lee West granted summary judgment for the telemarketers and concluded that
Congress had not specifically empowered the FTC to establish and enforce the
registry. 2 6 4  As grounds, the judge pointed to specific provisions in the TCPA giving
the FCC explicit authority to create a national do-not-call list and the lack of similar
provisions in the TCFPA as to the FTC. 26 5  However, just seven days after Judge
West's ruling, Congress rendered it moot by passing legislation explicitly authorizing
the FTC to "implement and enforce" the national do-not-call registry and ratifying the
do-not-call registry requirements in the amended Telemarketing Sales Rule.
266
Judge West did not address First Amendment issues related to the do-not-call
registry in his ruling in U.S. Security. However, just two days after his ruling in that
case, another federal district judge-Judge Edward Nottingham in Colorado-found the
do-not-call registry requirements unconstitutional in Mainstream Marketing Services,
Inc. v. FTC, another federal suit filed by telemarketers. 2 67  In doing so, Judge
Nottingham utilized the Central Hudson analysis to test the constitutionality of the
registry requirements under the First Amendment.
First, under the Central Hudson analysis, the judge concluded that the registry
requirements burdened constitutionally protected commercial speech sufficiently to
trigger the remaining three prongs of the Central Hudson analysis. 2 6 8 As he explained,
the do-not-call registry requirements apply to all "outbound telephone calls to induce
the purchase of goods and services" including truthful, non-misleading calls promoting
263. 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289-90 (W.D. Okla. 2003).
264. Id. at 1290-91, 1294.
265. Id. at 1291. In his ruling, Judge West rejected arguments by the FTC that the TCFPA included
implicit authority to establish the registry under provisions authorizing the FTC to regulate "abusive
telemarketing acts or practices." See id. In addition, the judge rejected the FTC's argument that the funding
provisions in the 2003 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act-which only explicitly authorized the FTC to collect
fees to fund the registry-necessarily included implicit authority to the agency to establish the registry in the
first place. See id. at 1291-92.
266. National Do-Not-Call Registry, Pub. L. No. 108-82, §6 117 Stat. 1006 (2003). Ultimately, the
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, overruled Judge West in any event and concluded alternatively
that the TCFPA provided implicit authority to the FTC to implement and enforce the national do-not-call
registry even before the specific legislation enacted by Congress's response to Judge West's ruling.
Mainstream Mktg. Serv., Inc., 358 F.3d 1228, 1250 (10th Cir. 2004). The Tenth Circuit also noted that, in any
event, the issue was rendered moot by the Congressional legislation. Id. (stating that "if some doubt once
existed [about the FTC's authority here], Congress erased it through subsequent legislation").
267. 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168 (D. Colo. 2003). For law review comment on the opinion by Judge
Nottingham prior to it being reversed on appeal, see generally Nelson, supra note, at 256.
268. Mainstream Mktg., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62, 1164. Judge Nottingham wrote:
[Tihe court determines that the do-not-call registry is a significant enough governmental intrusion
and burden on commercial speech to amount to a government restriction implicating the First
Amendment. The test enumerated in Central Hudson must, therefore, be applied in determining
the constitutionality of the FTC's amended Rules.
Id. at 1163.
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lawful goods and services.
269
Turning to the second Central Hudson factor, Judge Nottingham next determined
that the FTC had demonstrated two sufficiently substantial governmental interests.
270
The first was protecting the "well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home" including
the implicit right to "avoid unwanted communications." 271 The second was "protecting
consumers from deceptive and abusive telemarketing practices. ' 272  Next, the judge
turned to the final factors of the Central Hudson to determine whether the registry
requirements directly advanced these interests and, if so, whether they were narrowly
tailored. 273  However, ultimately, the judge found the do-not-call requirements
unconstitutional for failing the direct-advancement requirement and found it
unnecessary to reach the narrow-tailoring requirement under the fourth factor.
274
On the direct-advancement requirement, the judge addressed each asserted
governmental interest separately. First, as to the privacy-protection interest, Judge
Nottingham found the do-not-call registry requirements failed the direct-advancement
requirement because of the exemption for noncommercial calls. 275 He concluded it was
irrational to regulate commercial telemarketing calls while exempting noncommercial
calls when both types of calls resulted in the same potential net effect for consumers-
an unwanted and disturbing telephone call. 76Thus, he concluded, the FTC had failed to
justify the disparate treatment of commercial and noncommercial messages.2 77  In
269. See id. at 1162 (quoting the amended Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. §310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)).
270. Mainstream Mktg., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
271. Id. Judge Nottingham concluded the privacy protection interest was one of the "highest order in a
free and civilized society," suggesting that privacy protection was more than merely "substantial" as required
by the Central Hudson analysis. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1168. Judge Nottingham wrote, "Having held that the [do-not-call provisions in the] amended
Rules fail the second part of the Central Hudson test, the court chooses not to address the final part of the
test." Mainstream Mktg., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 11698.
275. Id. Judge Nottingham relied here on the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting. Id.
276. Id. at 1166, 1167. For instance, Judge Nottingham wrote, "There is no doubt that unwanted calls
seeking charitable contributions are as invasive to the privacy of someone sitting down to dinner at home as
unwanted calls from commercial telemarketers." Id. at 1166. He wrote further, "The regulation cannot
distinguish among the indistinct, permitting a variety of speech that entails the same harm as the speech which
the government has attempted to limit." Id. at 1166 (citation omitted).
277. Mainstream Mktg., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1168. On this point, the district judge wrote:
Were the do-not-call registry to apply without regard to the content of the speech, or to leave
autonomy in the hands of the individual .... it might be a different matter. As the amended Rules
are current formulated, however, the FTC has chosen to entangle itself too much in the consumer's
decision by manipulating consumer choice and favoring speech by charitable over commercial
speech. The First Amendment prohibits the government from enacting laws creating a preference
for certain types of speech based on content, without asserting a valid interest, premised on
content, to justify its discrimination.
Id. at 1168. Judge Nottingham concluded that the do-not-call registry was distinguishable from the postal
regulation upheld in Rowan because the latter applied without exemption and gave consumers "complete
autonomy to prevent any chosen material from entering his home." Id. at 1163. He wrote that the postal
regulation in Rowan had "no bearing" on consumer choice while the FTC's do-not-call registry only allowed
consumers to block commercial telemarketing calls and not other types. Id. One commentator writing about
the case before it ultimately was reversed on appeal by the Tenth Circuit suggested that a "potential solution"
to the constitutional issue would be to delete the exemptions for noncommercial telemarketing calls.
Jacquelyn Trussell, The Embattled Future of the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 85, 91 (2003). She noted, however, that application of the do-not-call registry requirements to
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addition, the judge concluded that the do-not-call requirements failed to directly
advance the government's interest in consumer protection from telemarketing fraud and
abuse. 278 On this point, the FTC had argued that commercial telemarketers were more
likely to engage in fraud and abuse than noncommercial ones. 279 However, the judge
found this unsubstantiated and ultimately unpersuasive.
280
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, reversed in 2004 and
found the registry requirements constitutional under the Central Hudson analysis.
28 1
The appeals court was persuaded by four "key aspects" of the registry:
First, the list restricts only core commercial speech .... Second, the do-not-call
registry targets speech that invades the privacy of the home, a personal sanctuary that
enjoys a unique status in our constitutional jurisprudence .... Third, the do-not-call
registry is an opt-in program that puts the choice of whether or not to restrict
commercial calls entirely in the hands of consumers. Fourth, the do-not-call registry
materially furthers the government's interests in combating the danger of abusive
telemarketing and preventing the invasion of consumer privacy, blocking a
significant number of the calls that cause these problems.
2 8 2
Under the first Central Hudson factor, the appeals court agreed with the district
judge that the do-not-call registry restricted truthful and non-misleading commercial
speech about lawful goods and services and therefore needed to be tested under the
noncommercial telephone calls "would likely violate the heightened First Amendment rights of
[noncommercial speakers]." Id. at 92. Another commentator writing about the case after it was reversed on
appeal by the Tenth Circuit but before the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari also described
additional constitutional issues that could arise in connection with attempts to extend the do-not-call registry
requirements to charitable solicitations. Strauss, supra note 155, at 37 (asserting that "[c]haritable
solicitations receive greater protection under the First Amendment than pure commercial speech"). See also
Janelle M. Romp, Comment, "Hello, May I Interest You in a Do Not Call List?, " A Comment on the Federal
Trade Commission's Proposal to Amend the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 639, 660-61
(2003) (concluding that "[p]roblems may arise, however, with application of the 'do not call' registry to
telemarketing carried out to solicit charitable donations" because "[tihe Supreme Court has held that such
activity is to be given greater First Amendment protection than ordinary commercial speech") (citing Riley v.
Nat'l Fed. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984);
Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)). When Judge Nottingham's
opinion was heard on appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly refused to express an opinion on
the constitutionality of the application of the do-not-call registry requirements to "political and charitable
callers." Mainstream Mktg. 358 F.3d at n.2 (10th Cir. 2004). As will be discussed next in this article, the
Tenth Circuit ultimately found the do-not-call registry constitutional as applied to commercial telemarketers
and overruled the district judge on that issue. Id. at 1233.
278. Mainstream Mktg., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1166-67.
279. Idat 1166.
280. Id. The judge suggested that the nonprofit or charitable status of a solicitor would not alone
guarantee pure motives. On this point, he wrote, "[m]any a mountebank has utilized the corporate form,
including nonprofit incorporation, to perpetrate fraud on unsuspecting consumers." Id. at 1167.
281. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1233. The Tenth Circuit's ruling embraced four cases consolidated
on appeal, which included the opinion issued by the United States District Judge Nottingham (D. Colo.) in
Mainstream Marketing and the ruling of United District Judge West (W.D. Okla.) in U.S. Security, along with
two cases involving the direct appellate review of the FCC order adopting its do-not-call rules. Id. at 1232,
1236 n.9. In addition, the Tenth Circuit considered the FTC and FCC do-not-call rules along with the
coordinated national do-not-call registry as "a single regulatory measure" for purposes of its constitutional
analysis. Id. at 1234 n.4.
282. Id. at 1233 (citation omitted).
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remaining factors. 283 Likewise, under the second factor, the appeals court agreed with
the district judge that the governmental interests in protecting consumer privacy and
alleviating the risks of "fraudulent and abusive solicitation" were substantial.
284
However, the appeals court ultimately found that the registry requirements satisfied
both the direct advancement and the narrow tailoring requirements of the final two
Central Hudson factors. 285
On the direct-advancement requirement, the appeals court first considered the
effectiveness of the registry requirements in light of the governmental interest in
protecting consumer privacy. 2 86  Specifically, the appeals court addressed the
constitutional validity of the regulatory focus on commercial telemarketing calls
exclusively and whether the exemption for noncommercial calls unconstitutionally
undermined the effectiveness of the regulatory scheme as a means of protecting
consumer privacy. 287 On this point, the appeals court admitted there was no evidence
in the record that established the number or percentage of telemarketing calls that would
be blocked or allowed by the registry requirements. 288However, the court concluded
283. Id. at 1237. The Tenth Circuit concluded:
[T]he government has asserted substantial interests to be served by the do-not-call registry (privacy
and consumer protection), the do-not-call registry will directly advance those interests by banning
a substantial amount of unwanted telemarketing calls, and the regulation is narrowly tailored
because its opt-in feature ensures that it does not restrict any speech directed at a willing listener.
In other words, the do-not-call registry bears a reasonable fit with the purposes the government
sought to advance. Therefore, it is consistent with the limits the First Amendment imposes on
laws restricting commercial speech.
Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1246.
284. Id. at 1237. On the privacy interest, the Tenth Circuit relied on a Supreme Court decision in Rowan
v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), in which the Court upheld as constitutional a postal
regulation that allowed a postal customer to request the Postmaster General to send a cease and desist order to
direct mail solicitors from whom the customer had received a direct mail solicitation that he or she found
sexually provocative and wished to receive no further mailings. See id. On the second asserted interest, the
Tenth Circuit quoted from the Supreme Court's opinion in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976), in which the Court provided First Amendment
protection but explained that the First Amendment would not prevent the government from "insuring that the
stream of commercial information flows cleanly as well as freely." Id. at 1238.
285. Id. at 1238, 1241--42, 1246. Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Ebel wrote: "The do-not-call
registry directly advances the government's interests by effectively blocking a significant number of the calls
that cause the problems the government sought to redress. It is narrowly tailored because its opt-in character
ensures that it does not inhibit any speech directed at the home of a willing listener." Id. at 1238.
286. Id. at 1238. The section of the Tenth Circuit's opinion addressing the direct advancement prong of
the Central Hudson analysis was titled "Effectiveness." Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238.
287. Id. at 1238-1242. The telemarketers had argued on appeal that the noncommercial exemption
rendered the registry requirements "unconstitutionally underinclusive." Id. at 1238. In addition, the
telemarketers who challenged the do-not-call registry argued that the exemption in the FCC telemarketing
rules for commercial telemarketing calls from companies that have an "established business relationship" with
a consumer was arbitrary and capricious because the FCC failed to consider the anticompetitive effect of such
an exemption. Id. at 1248. The appeals court rejected this argument and found that the FCC had sufficiently
considered that issue and made a "reasoned policy decision." Id. at 1250.
288. Id. at 1240-41. On this point, the appeals court wrote: "It is unclear from the record exactly how
many telemarketing calls will be blocked by the do-not-call regulations. Most significantly, we have not been
provided with data as to how many of these unsolicited sales calls would be permissible under the established
business relationship exception." Id. at 1240 n.1 1. The appeals court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion
in Went For It as legal justification for using anecdotal evidence and "common sense observation" in its direct
advancement analysis under the Central Hudson analysis. See id. (citing Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515
U.S. 618, 628 (1995)). However, the appeals court failed to note that the Went For It majority relied on a
combination of empirical and anecdotal evidence in upholding a 30-day ban on direct mail solicitations from
lawyers to accident victims, and that four justices dissented and sharply criticized the majority for its reliance
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that exact numbers were not necessary and instead relied on anecdotal evidence used by
Congress, the FCC and the FTC in support of related legislation and rules. 289 Thus, the
appeals court presumed that the registry requirements would likely prohibit a
"significant" number and percentage of all telemarketing calls despite the exemption for
noncommercial calls. 29  Similarly, the appeals court concluded the established-
business-relationship exemption did not undermine the effectiveness of the regulatory
scheme because "[c]onsumers [were] more likely to anticipate" telemarketing calls from
companies with whom they do business.
29 1
The appeals court also agreed with the FTC that the registry requirements directly
advanced the governmental interest in protecting consumers from telemarketing fraud
and abuse and that this goal was not unconstitutionally undermined by the
noncommercial exemption. 292 The court relied on FTC conclusions in the rulemaking
proceeding that commercial telemarketers are more likely than noncommercial callers
to utilize deceptive or abusive practices. 293 The appeals court found these conclusions
sufficient to establish direct advancement despite the lack of quantitative evidence in
the record to support them.
294
In finding the do-not-call registry requirements rational despite the noncommercial
exemption, the appeals court distinguished the regulatory scheme struck down as
irrational by the Supreme Court in Coors Brewing Co. 295 In that case, the appeals court
pointed out, the federal ban on alcohol content percentages on beer labels was found
"irrational" when considered alongside other federal regulations that permitted and even
required the same information on liquor and wine labels. 296  The noncommercial
exemption to the do-not-call registry requirements simply did not rise to that level of
irrationality, the appeals court concluded summarily.
297
on empirical studies without more detailed inquiry into the validity of the studies. See Went For It, 515 U.S.
at 640-41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsberg). The Court referred to
Florida's summary as a "selective synopses of unvalidated studies." Id. at 640.
289. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1240-41. On this point the appeals court wrote, "[iun applying
Central Hudson, however, we are entitled to rely on anecdotal evidence and make the common sense
observation that the do-not-call list will apply to a substantial number of telemarketing calls." Id. at 1240
(citing Went For It, 515 U.S. at 628 (1995)).
290. Id. at 1240-41.
291. Id. at 1241 (quoting FCC statement in Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,154 (July 25, 2003)).
292. Id. at 1241-42.
293. See id. at 1241. The Tenth Circuit relied on FTC conclusions that commercial telemarketers have a
greater incentive than noncommercial callers to engage "in all things that telemarketers are hated for" and that
"non-commercial speech is a different matter." Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1241 (quoting from 68 Fed.
Reg. at 4,637). The Tenth Circuit wrote, "[slpecifically, the FTC concluded that in charitable ... calls, a
significant purpose of the call is to sell a cause, not merely to receive a donation, and that non-commercial
callers thus have stronger incentives not to alienate the people they call or to engage in abusive and deceptive
practices." Id. at 1241 (referring to 68 Fed. Reg. at 4,637).
294. See id. at 1241 (citing Fed. Reg. 4,637). The Tenth Circuit summarized, "[t]he speech regulated by
the do-not-call list is therefore the speech most likely to cause the problems the government sought to
alleviate in enacting that list, further demonstrating that the regulation directly advances the government's
interests." Id. at 1241.
295. See id. at 1238-39.
296. Id. The appeals court noted that the Supreme Court found the "irrationality of this unique and
puzzling regulatory framework" constitutionally problematic. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238-39
(quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company, Inc., 514 U.S. 476, 489 (1995)).
297. Id. at 1238-39.
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In addition, the appeals court distinguished the Supreme Court's opinion in
Discovery Network.298  In that case, the Tenth Circuit pointed out, the city's ban on
commercial newsracks had only served to remove a very small number of the total
number of newsracks on the streets and was determined ineffective in reducing the
number of newsracks in the name of public safety and aesthetics. 299 On the other hand,
the court concluded, the do-not-call registry applied to commercial telemarketing calls,
which were the "type that Congress, the FTC and the FCC have all determined to be
most to blame for the problems the government is seeking to redress" 300 when
compared with noncommercial calls.
30 1
In addition to finding direct advancement, the Tenth Circuit also found that the do-
not-call registry requirements were narrowly tailored under the fourth Central Hudson
factor.302 As grounds for this holding, the appeals court wrote:
[T]he national do-not-call registry... does not over-regulate protected speech;
rather, it restricts only calls that are targeted at unwilling recipients .. . . The do-
not-call registry prohibits only telemarketing calls aimed at consumers who have
affirmatively indicated that they do not want to receive such calls and for whom
298. See id. at 1239.
299. Id. (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 412, 417-18 (1993)). The
appeals court wrote that the do-not-call registry "blocks a substantial amount of unwanted telemarketing
calls" while the newsrack ordinance at issue in Discovery Network "applied only to a minute and paltry
number of newsracks." Id. at 1246. In addition, the appeals court concluded that the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial newsracks in ordinance challenged in Discovery Network had "no
relationship whatsoever to the city's asserted interests" while the "do-not-call registry's commercial/non-
commercial distinction was based on findings that commercial telephone solicitation was significantly more
problematic than charitable or political fundraising calls." Id.
300. Id. at 1241. The appeals court also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1239-40. In Edge Broadcasting,
the Supreme Court upheld a federal regulation that banned lottery advertising on licensed broadcast media
despite an exemption that allowed a station to broadcast advertising for a legally-authorized state-run lottery
when the station was licensed in that same state. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 422-23. The ban was challenged
by a radio station in North Carolina that was located near the Virginia border that wanted to broadcast
advertising for the Virginia lottery. Id. at 423-24. North Carolina did not have a lottery while Virginia did,
and most of the listening audience for the North Carolina station was located in Virginia. Id. In a section of
the opinion that only drew five votes, the Court concluded that the ban directly advanced the asserted
government interest in "supporting the policy of nonlottery States, as well as not interfering with the policy of
States that permit lotteries." Id. at 426. The majority assumed that states had a valid interest in decreasing
demand for gambling by decreasing gambling advertising within their borders, and deferred to "legislative
judgments" in that regard. See id. at 434 (relying on Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. at 328, 344 (1986)).
However, the validity of this rationale was largely abandoned by the Supreme Court in more recent
commercial speech decisions. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510 (1996) (plurality
opinion); Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 476, 489-91, n.2. For a thorough discussion of the Court's shift in its
Central Hudson analysis in this regard, see generally, Hoefges, supra note 97, at 272-84; Hoefges and
Rivera-Sanchez, supra note 97.
301. See Sweet, supra note 155, at 971-74. For a discussion of the rationale for exempting charities,
pollsters and researchers, and political campaigns from do-not-call regulation, see Ayres and Funk, supra note
66, at 117-20 (describing these as "positive externalities" and summarizing data suggesting that consumers
were less annoyed by unsolicited telephone calls seeking charitable contributions than by commercial
telemarketing calls). These commentators argued that exemptions for noncommercial telephone calls should
not alone be grounds for striking down regulations of telemarketing calls as underinclusive. Id. at 127; cf
generally Levy and Silber, supra note 34, at 520 (discussing "privacy concerns that arise when nonprofit
fundraisers trade, sell, rent or otherwise exploit personal information about charitable donors that they obtain
in the course of obtaining donations").
302. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1242.
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such calls would constitute an invasion of privacy.
303
The appeals court cited two primary reasons in finding narrow tailoring. 304 First,
the court concluded, the do-not-call registry requirements left open alternate means of
communication between marketers and consumers. 30 5 For instance, the court pointed
out, a commercial business could use telemarketing to solicit consumers who had not
signed up for the national registry and had not specifically asked that business not to
call, and could utilize traditional mass media advertising to reach all consumers more
broadly.306 Consumers who wanted to receive commercial telemarketing calls had such
options as not signing up on the national registry, and signing up on the national registry
but granting written permission to individual businesses from whom they would like to
receive telemarketing calls. 307  The court wrote, "[f]rom the consumer's perspective,
the do-not-call rules provide ... different options allowing consumers to dictate what
telemarketing calls they wish to receive and what calls they wish to avoid."
' 30 8
Secondly, the Tenth Circuit was persuaded that available regulatory alternatives to
the national do-not-call registry would not as effectively accomplish the asserted
governmental interests of protecting consumer privacy, and preventing fraudulent and
abusive telemarketing calls. 309  The telemarketers had argued on appeal that the
existing company-specific do-not-call regulations and other such means as caller ID and
call rejection services would allow consumers to avoid unwanted calls. 31  However,
the appeals court was convinced by the FTC that company-specific do-not-call
requirements were ineffective in practice 311 and that reliance on avoidance mechanisms
such as caller ID would unreasonably require consumers to "compete in a technological
arms race with the telemarketing industry."
' 3 12
In support of its finding of narrow tailoring, the appeals court relied on the
Supreme Court's ruling in Rowan in which the Court upheld a postal regulation that
required direct mailers to stop mailing solicitations to postal customers who had found
their mailings objectionable and had registered on a company-specific do-not-mail list
303. Id. (citation omitted).
304. Id. at 1242, 1246.
305. See id. at 1243. On this point, the Tenth Circuit wrote, "[t]he do-not-call registry's narrow tailoring
is further demonstrated by the fact that it presents both sellers and consumers with a number of options to
make and receive sales offers." Id.
306. See id. at 1243-44.
307. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1244.
308. Id. The Tenth Circuit wrote, "[u]nder the circumstances we address in this case, we conclude that the
do-not-call registry's opt-in feature renders it a narrowly tailored commercial speech regulation." Id. at 1243.
309. Id. at 1244.
310. Id. at 1244-45.
311. Id. at 1244. The Tenth Circuit cited to conclusions made by the FTC in its supporting materials
accompanying the rulemaking process for the do-not-call rules. The FTC had concluded that the company-
specific approach was overly burdensome for consumers by requiring them to make an individual request to
each solicitor from whom they do not wish to receive calls and to keep track of their requests to enforce them,
and, in any event, that consumer requests not to call often were ignored by commercial solicitors.
Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1244.
312. Id. at 1245. The appeals court referred in the opinion to FTC conclusions in the supporting materials
that accompanied the rulemaking procedure. Id. at 1244 (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 4,580, 4,631). In those
materials, the FTC had concluded that "the company-specific approach is seriously inadequate to protect
consumers' privacy from an abusive pattern of calls placed by a seller or telemarketer." Id.
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maintained by the post office. 313 The Tenth Circuit viewed the postal regulation as
analogous to the do-not-call registry requirements because under both regulatory
schemes, consumers must take an affirmative step to block regulated solicitations.
314
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has identified constitutional issues that arise from government
restrictions on point-to-point commercial communications with a focus on
telemarketing regulations. The analysis of legislation and court opinions identified by
this research leads to various conclusions in light of the two primary constitutional
issues raised earlier in the article. These were the extent to which the First Amendment
tolerates more extensive restriction of point-to-point solicitations as opposed to mass-
mediated advertising, and the extent to which the First Amendment allows regulation of
commercial communications when noncommercial and other exemptions are included
in the regulatory scheme.
As to the first of these issues, Virginia Board of Pharmacy clearly stands for the
proposition that the First Amendment strongly protects the right of the commercial
speakers to disseminate truthful, non-deceptive information about lawful goods and
services along with a concomitant right of consumers to receive this information.
3 15
Implicit here, however, is the right of consumers to be free from unwanted commercial
communications. The Supreme Court explicitly recognized such a right in Rowan when
it upheld a do-not-mail regulation. 316 Therefore, preserving the right of commercial
speakers to communicate with willing recipients while simultaneously protecting the
right of unwilling recipients to opt out, seems to be the balance a regulation must strike
in order to withstand constitutional challenge. The lesson from the door-to-door
solicitation cases discussed previously-Martin and Village of Schaumburg-is that
failure to preserve the ability of willing speakers to communicate with willing recipients
can be constitutionally fatal to a regulatory scheme aimed at protecting unwilling
recipients. 317
In the context of regulating point-to-point communications, the courts have
required governmental interests that primarily relate to the mode of communication as
opposed to the specific content of the message. In the context of telemarketing
regulation, courts have found governmental interests substantial when focused on
preventing telemarketers from shifting tangible or intangible costs to recipients.
Specifically, in Destination Ventures and American Blast Fax, the telefax advertising
cases, the federal courts of appeals recognized a substantial governmental interest under
the Central Hudson analysis in protecting consumers and businesses from incurring
tangible costs of receiving unwanted telefax advertisements. In Mainstream Marketing,
313. Id. at 1243.
314. See id. at 1243. The Tenth Circuit wrote that "opt-in regulation is less restrictive than a direct
prohibition of speech." Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1243.
315. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
316. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (stating that the "mailer's right to
communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee").
317. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980); Martin v.
City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943).
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the Tenth Circuit recognized a substantial governmental interest in protecting
consumers from intangible costs related to unwanted telemarketing calls such as
disturbance of their private lives and annoyance in having to answer an unwanted
telephone call. In these cases, federal appeals courts concluded under the Central
Hudson analysis that restrictions on commercial telefax advertisements and
telemarketing solicitations directly advanced the governmental interest in preventing
these types of cost-shifting.
As to the second of the constitutional issues raised, both the federal ban on
unsolicited telefax advertising and the do-not-call registry requirements effectively
exempt noncommercial content from their regulatory requirements schemes. Discovery
Network, the billboard case discussed previously, stands for the proposition that an
exclusive regulatory focus on commercial speech can be problematic under the direct-
advancement requirement of the Central Hudson requirement unless the governmental
interest in fact relates to the commercial nature of the regulated communication. And,
as discussed, the billboard ordinance in Discovery Network failed that requirement
because there was nothing inherent about commercial newsracks that rendered them
more of a threat to public safety and aesthetics nor was there any evidence in fact that
supported the focus on commercial racks. Indeed, the evidence supported the opposite.
When point-to-point communications are regulated on legislative grounds such as
privacy protection and prevention of economic costs to recipients, the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial communications seems irrelevant from the
perspective of the unwilling recipient. For instance, as mentioned, an unwanted telefax
produces the same costs to the recipient whether it is commercial or not. Likewise, an
unwanted telephone call can be just as intrusive and annoying to the recipient regardless
of whether a telemarketer or political pollster is on the other end of the line. Thus, in
situations where there is no apparent connection between the regulatory goal and the
commercial nature of the communication, it seems necessary for the government to
demonstrate with sufficient evidence that the regulated commercial communication is
more prevalent and problematic than exempted communications.
The appeals courts in Destination Ventures, American Blast Fax and Mainstream
Marketing were all convinced by legislative and administrative findings that
commercial telefaxes and telemarketing calls were more prevalent and problematic than
noncommercial ones and, thus, justified the noncommercial exemption under the direct-
advancement requirement of the third Central Hudson factor. It bears mention here that
the amount and sufficiency of evidence required to prove direct-advancement has been
a source of controversy among the current Supreme Court justices 3 18 and remains an
issue yet to be addressed by the Court in the context of telemarketing regulation.
However, the majority approach of the Court in Went For It, the lawyer solicitation
case, seems to indicate that reliance on summaries and anecdotal evidence can be
sufficient in commercial speech cases under the Central Hudson analysis.
319
Federal appeals courts now have concluded that the federal ban on unsolicited
telefax advertising and the national do-not-call registry are constitutional under the
318. For discussion of this issue, see Hoefges and Rivera-Sanchez, supra note 97, at 373-75; Hoefges,
supra note 97, at 276-80.
319. See Lorrillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 557-61 (2001).
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Central Hudson analysis. The Supreme Court has declined requests to review the
decisions in these cases. For the time being, these federal regulatory schemes stand as
examples of how to constitutionally regulate point-to-point commercial
communications in a manner that preserves the rights of advertisers and marketers while
protecting the rights of consumers to receive-and not receive-targeted, commercial
communications.
